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Abstract 
SIMONE WElL AND IRIS MURDOCH: the relevance of personality to the 
concept of virtue 
I have tried to trace a recurring theme in Simone Weil's thought: 
I have not tried to make an appraisal of her theology as a whole. 
She was trained as a philosopher but her work transcends the 
conventional boundaries between disciplines. She was widely 
read and wrote with authority on history, education, poli~tics 
and comparative religion as well as philosophy, and in her 
personal faith and consequently her theology she drew extensively 
on this formidable cultural and intellectual background. As a 
as 
result her theological writings are complex butkthey are also 
very much of a piece I have been able to follow in them the 
theme of the fraudulence of personality. 
Simone Weil is deeply pessimitic about human nature and speaks 
of its gravitational force which only divine grace can reverse. 
This process she pictures as the takeover of the soul by Christ 
at the expense of the individual's personality which in itself 
can never offer the key to the attainment of virtue. She believes 
virtue to be very close to obedience, which we achieve through 
the exercise of attention. 
I have tried to explore the strong similarity which exists 
between this position and some aspects of the moral philosophy 
of Iris Murdoch who is also a pessimist about human nature. She 
too believes in an absolute good which we can only know by breaking 
down the barrier of self. I have used Dorothy Emmet, 
Elizabeth Anscombe and Mary Midgley as commentators on the state of 
British moral philosophy as deplored by Iris Murdoch, and 
Mary Midgley has provided me with a picture of personality which 
I think is more realistic than that of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch 
because i~ admits virtue as an actual quality not a mere ideal. 
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by 
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SIMONE WElL AND IRIS MURDOCH: 
the relevance of personality to the concept of virtue 
In the text I have used the following abbreviations 
for Simone Weil's works: 
AD 
CI 
CII 
CIII 
cs 
E 
LR 
OL 
PCAD 
PG 
SG 
Attente de Dieu 
Cahiers I 
Cahiers II 
Cahiers III 
La Connaissance surnaturelle 
L'Enracinernent 
' Lettre a un religieux 
Oppression et libert~ 
Pens~es 
de Dieu 
sans ordre concernant 
La Pesanteur et la grace 
La Source Grecque 
l'arnour 
The Sovereignty of Good by Iris Murdoch is referred 
to as "S o G". 
Unless it is stated otherwise, the translations are 
my own. 
PART ONE 
I Introduc..tion 
I should like to discuss various elements in Simone 
Weil's religious thought in the light of 
strands of thinking in current moral 
some particular 
philosophy. I 
think it is fair to discuss Simone Weil's writing against 
a philosophical rather than a theological background 
for several reasons: she was a professional philosopher 
but had had no formal theological training; she 
particularly valued the intellectual freedom which the 
study of philosophy allows and her teacher Alain at 
;I' 
the Lycee Henri IV positively encouraged; and for her 
the religious and the moral are anyway inextricably 
mixed. 
Iris Murdoch 
Platonist" 1 . 
calls Simone Weil "that 
She is a Platonist herself 
against a certain kind of moral crusade 
admirable 
and in her 
philosophy 
clearly counts Simone Weil as an ally, though she refers 
to her only in passing; she is doubtless aware of the 
problems that Simone Weil's Platonism has raised for 
her Christian commentators- is her thought Christian 
at all? but does not comment on them. And she need 
not: that Simone Weil wrote in the wake of what she 
took to be a genuine mystical experience, which propelled 
her from complete agnosticism to the brink of entry 
into the Catholic Church, is a circumstance which must 
weigh heavily on any assessment of her work which comes 
from within the Church; but secular commentators are 
free to be selective, to lay their emphasis on the aspects 
of her thought which best match their arguments or which 
they find most inspiring. On closer study S irnone Wei l 
is not what she at first sight might appear - that is, 
a particularly striking and committed 
truth and power of the Christian message. 
witness to the 
The theological 
task 
from 
of making 
orthodox 
clear just where 
Christian belief 
and 
has 
how she departs 
been well and 
thor-oughly carried out by Georges Fre'naud amongst others 2 , 
and with hindsight we can see her stubborn refusal to 
accept baptism and her gruesome death as indications 
that all wq..s not well. Divorced from the context of 
her life and the charge of heresy, her writing not only 
retains its fascination, but freed from an obligation 
to comply with a fairly rigid set of principles, is 
somehow vindicated, at least in part. Obviously this 
process takes place in the mind of the reader who, if 
he is not a Christian, is at liberty to take Simone 
Weil as he finds her, so to speak, without agonising 
about her immortal soul as do some of her Roman Catholic 
commentators. The Christian, as we have seen, is not 
at liberty in the same way: one wrong emphasis throws 
doubt on her whole body of thought. Iris Murdoch is 
agnostic, though she is far from being ready to dispense 
with the vocabulary of religious belief (she has something 
to say about grace, for example). She comes to the 
study of Simone Weil without any obligation to judge 
either Simone Weil as a person or her work in relation 
to a certain tradition; she can be said to take Simone 
Weil 1 s thought in its 11 soft 11 sense, and would probably 
find much she could recognise in Simone Weil 1 s picture 
of human nature. 
For Simone Weil not only man but the whole of creation 
was fallen - from which we can infer that she believed 
our imperfection to be a necessary and not a contingent 
fact about us. For her man was essentially wretched: 
"Contradiction alone is the proof that we are not 
everything. Contradiction is our misery and the 
consciousness of our misery is the consciousness of 
reality. For we do not create our misery. It is real. 
That is why we must value it. Everything else is 
imaginary 11 (PG126). Catholic commentators on Simone 
Weil are critical of her characterisation of the creation: 
2. 
"God abandons our entire being, flesh, blood, 
feelings, intellect, love, to the pitiless 
necessity of matter and to the cruelty of 
the devil, save the eternal or supernatural 
part of. the soul. 
Creation is abandonment. B y creating what 
is other than himself, God has necessarily 
abandoned his creation." (CS49) 
The suggestion that there is something shameful in our 
human condition is to be found elsewhere in Simone Weil's 
work, when, for instance, she writes that "God has emptied 
himself of his divinity and filled us with a false 
divinity. Let us empty ourselves of it. This act t s 
the end of the act which created us". (CS9l) 
And: 
"There is a necessary link between the 
supernatural and suffering. Man is made of 
flesh: how can he not suffer when united with 
the divine nature? In him, God is suffering 
so that he can be finished. Suffering made 
inevitable by the creation. Suffering without 
consolation, for consolations are manufactured 
by the imagination and one must be emptied 
of these to leave room for God. 
is the false divinity.• (C II 116) 
Imagination 
In ,_::reating the world God has destroyed himself in a 
sense; his creation, being absolutely other than himself, 
is beyond his power to control. Necessarily, for were 
it not beyond his power to control it would be but an 
extension of himself, and Simone Weil would have had 
no answer to give to the question which tormented her 
of how a loving God can reconcile himself to the existence 
of suffering in the world. But she found an answer: 
3 
"God causes this universe to exist while 
consenting at the same time not to command 
it though he has the power to do so - but 
to let reign in his place on the one hand 
the me~hanical necesity attached to matter, 
including the psychic matter of the soul, 
and on the other hand the autonomy essential 
to thinking people.~ (AD 146 
This characterisation of creation is repugnant to the 
Catholic theologian Charles Moeller who speaks for many 
critics of Simone Weil on this subject when he says 
that the creation is not an abdication of power by God 
but a communication of his power with us so that we 
can share in it. 3 Hilary Ottensmeyer considered Simone 
Weil' s belief that creation is offensive to God to be 
her fundamental error and the root of her contempt for 
4 human nature . Iris Murdoch, while not contemptuous 
of human nature, is not optimistic about it either, 
and this sets her apart from some of her fellow moral 
philosophers. 
Indeed, she does not consider herself to be in the 
mainstream of modern British philosophy. She stated 
in a recent interview with Rachel Billington5 that she 
feels very separate now from Oxford philosophers. This 
is presumably not only because she has decided to turn 
her whole attention to writing and sees herself as a 
novelist first and foremost, but also by virtue of her 
philosophical views which are out of tune with a tradition 
characteristically analytic and reductionist. If it 
is not too misleading to picture philosophical activity 
as a spectrum with, at one end, philosophy as an abstruse 
intellectual game demanding no qualifications apart 
from cleverness, and at the other, philosophy as the 
search for wisdom leading eventually to salvation, Iris 
Murdoch would be situated nearer to the latter end of 
the spectrum than most of her former colleagues. In 
the same interview she touched on this difference. 
"Philosophy is difficult", she admits, particularly 
her sort which does not divide the intellect from the 
will. Much recent philosophy sees things of the intellect 
as "clear aod hard and factual" while the will and the 
emotions are 11 peripheral and unclear" and that is where 
the religious instinct is presumed to lie. Philosophy, 
she would seem to imply, should involve the whole man, 
that is to say that not only should its subject matter 
comprise the whole range of human experience, but that 
the opacity and the irreducibility of the self should 
be respected. Iris Murdoch reproaches modern philosophy 
with failing to provide an adequate picture of human 
personality, with the result that our spirituality loses 
its crucial nature. Rachel Billington writes: "She 
does not believe in God, 'a personal 
why Buddhism has such an appeal for her. 
God', which is 
She does believe 
in 'spiritual change'. Christ is no more than a prophet. 
But the Christian mythology is, in her opinion, very 
important as 'a mode of understanding'. The religious 
dimension is essential". It is essential if we are 
to attempt to understand what people are like and 
essential if we are to attempt to become better. Iris 
Murdoch thinks that the main task of the moral philosopher 
is to address himself to the question, "How can we make 
ourselves better?", and that some moral philosophers 
have lost sight of this end because they have been blinded 
by an attractive but misleading "scientific" model of 
human nature. The religious dimension is essential 
because it allows us to express truths about ourselves 
which can be expressed in no other way. 
Iris Murdoch is a moral philosopher with a mission to 
guard the special "moral" quality of this branch of 
philosophy against moves to subsume it under a view 
of philosophy which can broadly be called linguistic. 
Of course philosophy is to a great extent concerned 
5 
with the way language relates to the world and with 
the definition and redefinition of concepts, and internal 
coherence must be required of any philosophical argument 
if it is to be worthy of that description. But as 
Iris Murdoch points out, ordinary language is not a 
philosopher . ( SOG 57) . The idea that our experience 
should be limited and even defined by the language we 
employ to talk about it is a dangerous one, she believes, 
because it neutralises moral philosophy by denying the 
truth that good is "outside" us where no process of 
analysis, however thorough, 
follow from this, for 
can find it. 
instance, that 
Several things 
goodness and 
knowledge are connected. Iris Murdoch rightly perceives 
that in today's philosophical climate of opinion this 
is a radical view which has to be defended and this 
she does in particular depth in her essay entitled "The 
Idea of Perfection". (From now on I shall use the term 
"existentialist" as a blanket one to cover the 
existentialist/rationalist/linguistic/analytic conglom-
erate against whose picture of morality Iris Murdoch 
is setting herself.) Roughly, her argument is as follows: 
that the insistence by the existentialist tradition 
that goodness, and wickedness, exist at the point of 
contact of the executing will with the public world, 
and at that point alone, is mistaken; that what we can 
infer from this about human nature is not only inaccurate 
- people are not as the existentialist thinks they are 
but morally reprehensible. There would be something 
wrong with people if they were 1 ike that, so that to 
restore both goodness and the human will to their correct 
places in the scheme of things we have to see that 
goodness can never be a function of the will. Values, 
says Iris Murdoch, are transcendent. They provide a 
standard against which we succeed or fail, improve or 
deteriorate, grow in moral stature or decline and 
in the light of which we might be judged, if Iris Murdoch 
believed in a God to do the judging. In this atmosphere 
the idea of moral progress, for which there is little 
' 
use in the split-second, one-off, disconnected world 
of existentialist decisionmaking, deserves re-examination 
and it is at this point in particular that Iris Murdoch 
looks to Simone Weil for inspiration. 
7 
1. 
2. 
3 . 
4. 
5. 
I. Murdoch, The Fire and the Sun, 85 . 
.. G. Frenaud, "Simone Weil's Religious Thought in 
the light of Catholic Theology", passim. 
c. Moeller, Litterature du XXe si~cle et ehristianisme 
I : Silence de Dieu, 246. 
H. Ottemsmeyer, Le th~me de l'amour dans l'oeuvre de 
Simone Weil, 57. 
The Times, April 25, 1983. 
8 
II The idea of moral progress in 
Simone Well's work 
Simone Weil. could not believe in special providence, 
which, along with the concept of the miraculous, she 
dismissed as meaningless: 
" an ingenious thought expressed in a 
New York Catholic review, on the last 
anniversary of the discovery of America. 
It was that God had sent Christopher Columbus 
to America so that several centuries later 
there should be a country capable of defeating 
Hitler ..... this is atrocious the 
extermination of the peoples of America in 
the sixteenth century did not seem to him 
a high price to pay for the salvation of 
n 
twentieth century Europeans ..... (E 238). 
Charles Moeller believed that disgust with the way in 
which Christians would like to monopolise providence 
for the benefit of their little personal projects pushed 
Simone Weil into the arms of Stoicism1 (where she was 
anyway happy to be because of her great admiration for 
the thought and civilisation of ancient Greece). Her 
acceptance of necessity as destiny is condemned as 
heretical by most of her critics, though Louis Salleron 
says her theology of the creation as God in retreat, 
and suffering and death as the only ways of salvation, 
is both Christian and Catholic. 2 
"God sends misfortune indiscriminately to good 
people and to bad, as he sends the sun and 
the rain. He has not kept the cross for Christ. 
He only comes into contact with the human 
individual as such through purely spiritual 
grace which is his response when we turn our 
regard to him. That 
with the individual 
the individual gives 
is, he comes 
exact 
into contact 
to 
No event is a favour 
(PG l48j 
the extent that 
up his individualilty. 
11 from God except grace. 
In the meantime - and I do find in Simone Weil's theology 
hints that God's withdrawal from us is not for all time-
he might as well not exist. But our obligations towards 
him remain. Blind necessity is the instrument which 
reveals to us our essential wretchedness essential 
because it has as its cause a gravitational force which 
grips our very nature, not just the weighty objects 
of the external world. There is no escape from gravity 
and yet we must love it because it represents to us 
the will of God. So she says, "Matter is entirely 
passive, and by consequence entirely obedient to the 
will of God. It is for us a perfect model " (ADll2 \ 
If this is the case then, as Charles Moeller points 
out, it would have been better for man not to have 
existed. And to reach this conclusion is to play into 
the hands of the devil, all of whose activity is jealousy 
of man made in the image of God 3 • For Simone Weil 
believes that we can and should achieve the state of 
obedience and that suffering is the means by which we 
are trained for it. She makes a distinction between 
suffering and affliction. Simple physical pain is nothing 
beside real affliction; a few hours of violent pain 
once over are soon forgot ten, but affliction, of which 
physical suffering is a necessary but not a sufficient 
component, tears at the very roots of our being and 
destroys us in our own eyes, fragmenting the person 
we believe ourselves to be and removing all hope. It 
is a characteristic of affliction a necessary one 
that it should imprison us in a kind of hell from 
which there 
possibility 
is no 
of escape 
escape, 
would 
10 
because belief 
be a consolation 
in 
and 
the 
in 
affliction we are 
it mildly, dwells 
inconsolable. Simone Weil, to put 
Moeller on this subject. Charles 
described her 
pathological 4 , 
the light of 
attitude 
which it 
so-called 
to suffering as morbid and 
no doubt is if considered in 
normal behaviour. One thing 
Weil's pain 
her attempts 
even her 
on behalf 
h~rshest critics 
of the afflicted 
allow: Simone 
was real and 
to identify with them - for example the few months she 
spent working in the Renault factory in 
Boulogne-Billancourt - were more than academic exercises, 
however artificial they may seem. These experiments 
did not and could not work at the level Simone Weil 
intended them to for reasons which Susan Taubes makes 
clear in her article "The Absent Gocf: Simone's wealthy 
parents made repeated efforts to rescue her from 
situations which threatened to destroy her, and she 
may despite herself have welcomed their interventions 
even though they were a proof of her failure. She was 
bitterly disappointed not to be chosen for dangerous 
resistance work in occupied France. Instead she was 
given a task to write a treatise on human values 
for which she was clearly more sui ted but which did 
not allow her to sacrifice herself in the way she felt 
she was called to do. The inquest on her death returned 
a verdict of "suicide while the balance of the mind 
was disturbed". She had not told her parents that she 
was ill, thereby cutting herself off from their saving 
influence. Understanding Simone Weil' s theology of 
affliction is very difficult because we are bound in 
our reading of it to be influenced by what we know of 
her behaviour, and rightly so. In human terms Simone 
Weil' s life was not a happy nor a successful one; she 
did things that happy people do not do, such as refusing 
desperately needed medical attention, and she did 
not achieve that degree of adjustment which we would 
only that 
her life 
consider normal and heal thy. 
something had gone very wrong 
in the way she did but that 
" 
So we feel 
for her to 
her basic 
not 
end 
premises must 
have been mistaken for her to have ever found herself 
on the road which led so directly to self-destruction. 
Charles Moeller said that if death had not existed Simone 
Weil would have invented it5. Affliction is real and 
Simone really suffered because of this in a way which 
is a lesson. to the complacent, but Susan Taubes believes 
that she bore this suffering in the wrong spirit, 
passively: 
What 
"It is the specific mark of human 
that it points beyond the sheer 
of pain to an ideal norm which 
suffering 
immediacy 
applies to 
man as such within a historical reality. 
The chain of the oppressed of all ages burdens 
man not merely by its physical weight but 
as a wrong. It has been the crime of religion 
against humanity to teach men that slavery 
under whatever form is not a wrong but a fate. 
It reaches its most scandalous expression 
in the view that the suffering of the innocent 
is a special sign of the love of God. Thereby 
religion not only sanctions the present 
sufferings of the injured but paralyses the 
nerves of a historical community based on 
a mutual responsibility between the 
"6 generations. 
disturbs Susan Taubes is Simone 
characterisation of extreme affliction as the 
Weil's 
bridge 
between God and man, the concentration in the strongest 
possible form of that immensity of blind brute force 
which is the sum of necessity as it exists throughout 
space and time, and which separates man from God. Extreme 
affliction Simone Weil likens to a nail whose point 
is positioned at the centre of the soul, the head of 
this nail being necessity. In this way anonymous 
affliction can be said to pierce our very soul at a 
point which represents the whole burden of man's infinite 
12. 
distance from God, localised in such a way that if in 
the midst of his pain a man can continue to want to 
love God then he will find himself no longer separated 
from God but with him at that point of intersection 
between the creation and the creator. In other words 
affliction is a device which allows man to return to 
God the love which God has lavished on man. 
Simone Weil calls affliction a marvel of divine technique. 
Victor Gollancz, an admirer of some aspects of Simone 
Weil's work, is moved by this to call her god a monster 
of cruelty if he chooses such a way to enable himself 
better to love himself. 7 Setting aside for a minute 
the devastating conclusion, the mechanics of her argument 
from afflict ion to the love of God are far from easy 
to follow because she makes cryptic statements, such 
as, "Relentless necessity, misery, distress, the crushing 
burden of poverty and of exhausting labour, cruelt~ 
torture and violent death, constraint, terror and disease 
- all this is but the divine love. It is God who out 
of love withdraws from us so that we can love him " 
(CS49). We also find statements which seem almost 
deliberately perverse: 
"For those who love, separation, however painful, 
is a good because it is love. Even the distress 
of the abandoned Christ is a good. There 
cannot be a greater good for us here below than 
to have a part in this abandonment. God cannot 
be perfectly present to us here below because 
of our flesh. But in extreme affliction he can 
be almost perfectly absent from us. For us on 
earth this is the sole possibility of perfection. 
This is why the Cross is our one hope." (AD 110) 
,., 
Such statements of belief would seem to have their origin 
in a profound sense of personal guilt and unease, and 
demonstrate a contempt for all that is human, including 
our human need for encouragement and solace. She despises 
any tendency. to meet this need through a belief in divine 
providence or an indulgence in day dreaming and wishful 
thinking. There is a trace 
Iris Murdoch's thought, one 
of this same austerity in 
of the first indications 
the two. Here then is the of the connection between 
first clue to her understanding of what may count as 
moral progress. 
Next, Simone Weil believed that we were created only 
so that we could become uncreated: 
«A day comes when the soul belongs to God, 
when not 
actually, 
soul must 
only does it consent to 
truly loves. So in its 
cross the universe to 
love, 
turn 
reach 
but 
the 
God. 
The soul does not love like a created being 
with a created love. This love it feels is 
divine, uncreated, for it is the love of God 
for God which is passing through the soul. 
Only God is capable of loving God. All we 
can do is consent to the loss of our own 
feelings to make way in our soul for the passage 
of this love. That is what it is to negate 
oneself. It is for this consent alone that 
•• we were created. (AD 118) 
Her view was that before that day comes there is likely 
to be a period of struggle because the soul, subject 
to the laws of gravity in all but a tiny, hidden part 
of itself, will want to embrace its created state by 
equipping itself with a substantial self, a personality. 
Simone Weil believes that this personality is in fact 
insubstantial, illusory even, but that the attraction 
it exerts over us is so strong that it takes the terrible 
force of afflict ion, which destroys us in our own eyes 
as well as the eyes of others, to show it up for what 
it is, or was - a dream: 
"For so long as circumstances play around us 
while leaving our being more or less intact 
or only partly damaged we believe more or 
less that our will has created 
is governing it. Misfortune 
the world 
teaches us 
and 
all 
of a sudden, to our great surprise, that our 
will is nothing." (PCAD 122 ) 
Now it is certainly true that people can be broken by 
their suffering and that one can set about breaking 
people in a cold-blooded and calculating way, provided 
that one has some knowledge of psychology. But from 
this we should not conclude that personality is an 
illusion (this applies to will, too, as it is another 
aspect of the same concept) - quite the reverse is true. 
That we can be broken suggests that there is something 
to break; that we can be broken in a deliberate way 
suggests that we have a psychology, that human personality 
is real to an extent where it can be studied and certain 
generalistations can reasonably be made about it. And 
secondly, Simone Weil does seem to be dealing in very 
extreme situations; it is not many of us who experience 
the extreme affliction which she so graphically describes, 
nor who are megalomaniac enough ever to think that our 
will is everything. Of course it is true that we are 
not quite the people we believe ourselves to be, that 
sometimes we protect our images of ourselves with lies 
and deceptions. This is a different thing from trying 
to drive a wedge between two aspects of our nature, 
which when considered in isolation one from the other 
can only be understood as metaphors and even then are 
misleading. 
15 
Simone Weil believes that the chief obstacle on the 
road to uncreated love is personal fantasy, to which 
we are all addicted because of its tremendous power 
of consolation, which is so great that sometimes even 
great suffering is not enough to open our eyes to the 
real world,. in which " there is affliction every 
time necessity in whatever form makes itself felt so 
violently that the person who has undergone the shock 
cannot possibly find an escape in self• delusion. This 
is why the purest beings are the most vulnerable to 
misfortune." (AD 202 ) 
Space and time are the formal conditions of our experience 
as created beings as long as we are in their thrall 
we are in a false position from which we must continually 
be struggling to escape that is, trying to see beyond 
appearance to real_i ty. I think there is a lot of truth 
in this; the value of art, or one of its values, lies 
in its perception of truths which are universal, and 
recognisable as such when presented to us in a convenient 
form, but which do not announce themselves to us in 
everyday life in the absence of the artist's discerning 
eye. This is to posit the existence of two worlds, 
one immediately accessible but full of illusions and 
trickery, the other more distant somehow and more real. 
When Simone Weil says, "Let us draw back the veil of 
unreality and see what is thus given to us" she is of 
course speaking figuratively, but even a figure of speech 
which suggests a possible dislocation between "the world" 
and "our perception of the world" is unfortunate if 
it suggests that we are potentially trapped and isolated 
in our minds. I shall come back to this point. Simone 
Weil says that if we want to see beyond the created 
world to the supernatural truths of uncreated love we 
must rid ourselves of time's illusions: "Time, strictly 
speaking, does not exist (except for the present as 
a limit.) But despite this it is time to which we are 
subject We are genuinely bound by unreal chains. 
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Time is unreal and it veils ourselves and everything 
else in unreality" (PG 67). 
As an example, Simone Weil cites the very human tendency 
to believe that the future will be more fulfilling than 
the present, There is a temptation to put off living 
until some point in the future, which is a pure product 
of the imagination guaranteed to have no correlate in 
experience. We know this and yet we persist in our 
belief 
Simone 
of a good time to 
Weil was diagnosing 
come ( PCAD 13). 
a personal failing 
Perhaps 
for she 
writes in a notebook "You live in a dream. You are 
waiting to live" (CI 13). Letting go our imaginative 
hold on the future is one step on the way to decreation, 
that complex spiritual discipline which might be crudely 
summed up as getting rid of personal baggage which will 
burden the soul returning to God. Another step is 
accepting the past, that is, 
compensation for past injuries 
ceasing to expect 
(forgiving). We 
future 
should 
try to reduce ourselves to the point which we occupy 
in space and time - to nothing (PG 17). So, 
tt We must empty ourselves of our false divinity, 
deny ourselves, give up being in imagination 
the centre of the world and recognise all 
the other points of the world as being as 
much a centre as we are to ourselves, and 
the real centre as being outside the world. 
To do this is to consent to the reign of 
mechanical necessity in the material world, 
and free will at the centre of each soul. 
This consent is love. The face of this love 
when turned towards thinking beings is love 
of our neighbour; turned towards matter it 
is love of the order of the world, or - what 
is the same thing love of the beauty of 
the world." (AD 148) 
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It is a very 
siting of our 
come to think 
real danger of 
percept ions in 
of ourselves as 
our created state the 
space and time that we 
being at the core of the 
universe, with the consequence which Simone Weil rightly 
deplores that other people do not always seem quite 
real to us. existing only in relation ourselves, and 
coloured by our attitude towards them. 
The moral 
I want to 
I dispute 
dangers here are obvious, but in particular, 
take issue with her on two points. Firstly, 
that we are in the grip of fantasy to the 
extent she suggests when she says: "We are born and 
we live with lies. We hear only lies. Even about 
ourselves; we think that we are seeing ourselves, and 
we are only seeing the shadow of ourselves " ( SG 91 ). 
Even allowing for poetic overstatement I think Simone 
Weil puts her case too strongly. It is true that we 
very often deceive ourselves, but only in certain areas 
and not, unless we are mentally ill, about everything, 
and these del us ions can be revealed for what they are 
without causing the person that harboured them to crumble 
away to nothing. My second objection is really an 
extension of this point: it is wrong to speak of the 
self as if it were something we should - and could 
dispose of if we are ever to know reality, impersonal 
and universal, as when she writes, " that which we 
take to be ourself is a product as fleeting and as 
dependent on exterior circumstances as the form of a 
wave in the sea " ( PCAD 115). 
At this point we notice 
Simone Weil in looking 
She believes that: 
that Iris ~urdoch joins 
for salvation beyond the 
" The psyche is a historically determined 
individual relentlessly looking after itself. 
In some ways it resembles a machine; in . order 
to operate it needs sources of energy, and 
I& 
with 
self. 
it is 
activity. 
predisposed 
The area 
to 
of 
certain patterns of 
its vaunted freedom 
of choice is not usually very great. One 
of its main pastimes is daydreaming. It is 
reluctant to 
conscioysness 
glass through 
a cloud of 
designed to 
face unpleasant realities. Its 
is not normally a transparent 
which it views the world, but 
more or less fantastic reverie 
protect the psyche from pain. 
It constantly seeks consolation, either through 
imagined inflation of self or through fictions 
of a theological nature. Even its loving 
is more often than not an assertion of self. 
I think we can probably recognise ourselves 
in this rather depressing description.• (SOG 
79) 
Well, that is debatable. 
is a Weilian insistence 
human nature in the raw, 
regard to moral progress 
However, what we can recognise 
on the gravitational force of 
its fundamental badness. With 
therefore, Iris Murdoch and 
Simone Weil coincide to a marked extent in the remedies 
they propose for our sickness, which are concerned with 
cutting through the mass of self-centred fantasy with 
which we tend to obscure reality, and thereby obtaining 
knowledge of reality as it is in itself rather than 
as we would like it to be. According to Simone Weil 
we should go about this - paradoxically - by being passive 
even to the extent of not being. Iris Murdoch is 
admittedly less extreme; she does not say we should 
annihilate the self, only forget it, and one way to 
do this is to learn to appreciate beauty because our 
appreciation of beauty is necessarily disinterested. 
Following Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch D. Z. Phillips 
says: 
when ambition 
and we have come 
threatens to destroy 
to regard everyone 
us, 
and 
everything as instruments for our own use, 
what Simone Weil calls 'The love we feel for 
the splendour of the heavens, the plains, 
the sea and the mountains, for the silence 
of nature' can give us something which cannot 
be used, namely, the beauty of the world. 
One cannot use beauty, one can only contemplate 
it, since as Simone Weil says, 'it only gives 
itself, it never gives anything else' ... 
By this kind of contemplation one's 
self-centredness is destroyed~S 
Although this line of reasoning does carry some 
convict ion, there are object ions which can be levelled 
against it. Firstly, I do not find the gloomy picture 
of our human nature which Iris Murdoch, (and to some 
extent D. Z. Phillips) provides to be one which is 
essentially true, but I think this is what Iris Murdoch 
implies (Simone Weil certainly does). Now of course 
everyone is selfish some of the time and probably quite 
a lot of people are selfish most of the time, but that 
is a fact about them as individuals. It should not 
be used as a ground for saying that this is what human 
nature really is like, and that those people who appear 
to act unselfishly quite a lot of the time are either 
clever at seeming to be what they are not, or have by 
use of the quasi -religious techniques which Iris Murdoch 
recommends, managed to achieve self-mastery and are 
now no longer ordinary people at all but a sort of higher 
being. It is not true that we achieve goodness, if 
at all, in spite of ourselves, or perhaps as Iris 
Murdoch is a Platonist in spite of the lower parts 
of ourselves. This is how she describes the Platonic 
view of the soul: 
"The lowest part 
irrational, and 
is aggressive and 
of the soul is egoistic, 
central . part deluded, 
ambitious, 
2.0 
the 
the highest part 
------------------------------------------------ - ----
is rational and good and knows the truth which 
lies beyond all images and hypotheses. The 
just man and the just society are in harmony 
under the direction of reason and goodness. 
This rational harmony 
(indestructible) lower 
possible satisfaction~9 
also 
levels 
gives to 
the:ir 
the 
best 
This idea of a divided self permeates Simone Weil's 
writing, as does her be 1 ief that the flesh, in itself, 
is bad and must be broken; only on this condition can 
we be lifted up by divine grace. 
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III Moral progress and grace 
The greatness of Christianity, says Simone Weil, lies 
in the fact that it does not look for a supernatural 
remedy for suffering, but a supernatural use of it 
( PG 10 6) . Thus, "Resignation 
innocent can only arise in 
to the suffering of 
the soul through 
the 
the 
contemplation and acceptance of necessity, which is 
the rigorous chain of secondary causes " ( LR 54) . 
Charles Moeller understands the supernatural element 
to be a chain of necessity superimposed on that of inert 
rna t ter. From this it follows that we need do nothing 
to improve political and social conditions because such 
as they are, a blind mechanism, they destroy the flesh 
and thus automatically assure union with the divine. 1 
That Simone Weil did not really accept this logical 
conclusion of her belief in the acceptance of necessity 
as destiny she showed in her life through her concern 
for the conditions of the workers. 
There is however, a strong element of a certain kind 
of mysticism in her work and a feature of this is her 
tendency to discount the importance of human personality 
and political and social action through a too-rigorous 
programme of abstraction. Human responses cease to 
be valued for their individuality and the ideal held 
up is of a being whose flesh has been disciplined not 
to interfere with the action of grace (SG 113). Victor 
Gollancz takes issue with Simone Weil on this point: 
"She sees us as objects of God, capable of 
nothing good of our own human nature, capable 
of something good only when visited, or as 
she might put it, when kissed by spiritual 
grace; when visited specially or kissed 
specially. My thought is quite different. 
I feel God about everywhere: and I feel him 
far more naturally and regularly mixed up 
with us, and us with him and his goodness, 
than Simone does~2 
We have seen how Simone Weil interpreted the creation 
as abdication of God in favour of necessity. God is 
absent from this world and with him has gone the doctrine 
of Adam created in the image of God, and its consequence 
that we can freely chose the good. We may think we 
are free but we are no more free than a falling stone 
(AD 101). "To carry one's cross is to carry the knowledge 
that one is entirely subject to this blind necessity 
in every part of one's being save a point in the soul 
so secret that one is not conscious of it '' (PA 110). 
Once again the idea is present of man as a passive vehicle 
for grace - our virtue should take us almost by surprise. 
This is very important; Simone Weil is drawing a radical 
distinction between spirit and matter, including the 
psychic rna tter of the soul. It is as if each one of 
us harbours an alien, mysterious potential for saintliness 
which is not explicable in terms of human nature but 
rather is our means of escape from that human nature. 
"This mechanical necessity has us constantly in its 
grip; we can escape from it only to the extent in which 
the true supernatural has a place in our souls " (AD 
73 ). We escape from what is dangerous or distasteful; 
in this instance our natural tendency to behave badly. 
For example, it is only human to want revenge for some 
evil which has been done to us or to transfer the harm 
done to someone else, "to take it out on someone", so 
releasing the tension created by aggressive instincts 
and recovering lost sel~steem. Only through divine 
grace, says Simone 
pull of gravity. 
Weil, can we resist the downward 
"One cannot acquire for oneself by 
suggestion things which are incompatible. Only grace 
can do this. A compassionate person who makes himself 
2+ 
courageous 
can give 
by suggestion 
courage without 
for compassion, or give 
without sapping courage." 
becomes hard only grace 
reducing 
an ability 
(PG 132) 
a person's capacity 
to feel compass ion 
There is s~pport in this for those who accuse Simone 
Weil of Manicheanism; she seems to want to say that 
the soul is a battleground in the war between good and 
evil, in this case represented by the opposing forces 
of gravity and grace. Now this is quite intelligible 
up to a point because we all know what internal moral 
struggle is, and during it we do feel, figuratively 
speaking, as if we were being pulled first in one 
direction and then in another. And it is probably true 
that for most of us at least it is easier to behave 
badly than to behave well not of course that we do 
always take the line of least resistance, but doing 
so will lead us more often to the moral depths than 
the moral heights. But Simone Weil is saying more than 
this, namely that we as indi victuals are not only not 
in control of the warring elements within us but not 
even involved in the struggle. For that necessity which 
governs our thoughts and actions is impersonal, effecting 
as it does indiscriminately everything within its sphere 
of influence, while supernatural grace working in us 
is represented as a secret flame lit and fanned by some 
mysterious other, in a way quite beyond our power to 
understand. As Victor Gollancz says, we become objects 
to be acted upon rather than whole people whose infinite 
perfectability can be understood in terms of our own 
humanity. This is not to dispense with God; because 
God created man in his own image he is already there. 
We do not need to introduce him through the back door. 
I think this is what Gollancz means when he says - "I 
feel God about everywhere: and I feel him far more 
naturally and regularly mixed up with us, and us with 
him and his goodness, than Simone does."3 
2.5 
Here is another point of contact between Simone Well 
and Iris Murdoch, who also understands grace (though 
divorced from its theological context of course) as 
something essentially mysterious, whose workings are 
outwith our control. "We often receive an unforeseen 
reward for a fumbling half-hearted act: a place for 
the idea of grace " ( SOG 4 3) . Neither is in agreement 
with Victor Gollancz over the possibility of goodness 
being absolute and entirely hwnan at the same time; 
both think grace is a supernatural phenomenon which 
brings us extra help. 
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IV Moral progress and Cartesianism 
The prevalent Cartesian dualism of mind (understood 
as reason) _- and rna t ter in Simone We il' s work has far-
reaching consequences. Mary Midgley says that as soon 
as we start thinking of ourselves as disembodied 
intelligences cut off from the main-springs of our being 
(the concept of disembodied existence on close examination 
proves to be meaningless or at least highly problematic), 
we run the risk of deceiving ourselves into thinking 
that essential characteristics, such as our need for 
security, are contingent: "We are not dis embodied 
intelligences, tentatively considering possible 
incarnations. We have highly particular, sharply limited 
needs and possibilities already in return for which 
restriction, of course, we have the advantage that our 
sa ti sfac t ions, such as they are, are actual." 1 As Mary 
Midgley points out, existentialist claims that we operate 
in total freedom are very wide of the mark, as is the 
existentialist assumption that we do not have a history 
in the biological sense. In a perceptive comment she 
remarks that 
"'The really monstrous thing about Existentialism 
too is its proceeding as if the world contained 
only dead matter (things) on the one hand 
and fully rational, educated, adult human 
beings on the other as if there were no 
other life - forms. The impression of desertion 
or abandonment which Existentialists have 
is due, I am sure, not to the removal of God, 
but to this contemptuous dismissal of almost 
the whole biosphere plants, animals, and 
children. Life shrinks to a few urban rooms; 
no wonder it becomes absurd~2 
This isolation of reason so that it can be set up as 
the supreme faculty has led to an identification of 
the will (reason in action) with the self. The criteria 
by which actions are judged have become purely public 
ones, operating in a material world in relation to which 
my inner me.ntal world is shadowy or parasitic. It is 
the way in which I relate to the world which makes me 
the person I am, thus, ideally, I should be totally 
responsible for my actions and always fully aware of 
my range of options. Of course these conditions may 
turn out in practice to be impossible to realise, but 
they are held up to us as the ideal for which we should 
strive. Let us assume that they have been fulfilled 
and that the moral deliberation which can now take place 
is pure and untainted by any suggestion of fear, 
ignorance, neurosis, love or hate etc. The trouble 
with this picture, which is by virtue of its clean simple 
lines undeniably attractive, is that life is just not 
like that. With the virtual disappearance of the 
substantial self we lose that fund of imaginative sympathy 
- and the richer it is the better - which makes morality 
a going concern. Iris Murdoch is eloquent on this point: 
"How recognisable, how familiar to us is the 
man so beautifully portrayed in the Grundlegung, 
who confronted even with Christ turns away 
to consider the judgement of his own conscience 
and to hear the voice of his own reason. 
Stripped of the exiguous metaphysical background 
which Kant was prepared to allow him, this 
man is with us still, free, independent, lonely, 
powerful, rational, responsible, brave, the 
hero of so many novels and books of moral 
philosophy. The raison d'~tre of this 
attractive but 
far to seek. 
of science, 
misleading creature is not 
He is the offspring of the age 
confidently rational and yet 
increasingly aware of his alienation from 
The 
the material universe which his discoveries 
reveal He is the ideal citizen of the 
liberal state, a warning held up to tyrants. 
He has the virtue which the age requires and 
admires, courage. It is not such a very long 
step f~om Kant to Nietzsche, and from Nietzsche 
to existentialism and the Anglo-Saxon ethical 
doctrines which in some ways closely resemble 
it. In fact Kant's man had already received 
a glorious incarnation nearly a century earlier 
in the work of Milton: his proper name is 
Lucifer." (SoG 80) 
idea of free choice as understood by the 
existentialist, 
in philosophy, 
Anglo-Saxon 
appeals to the 
and analytic 
strong and 
traditions 
the rational 
among us, those who can live in a world which is without 
the familiar supports of religion, conventional morality 
and blind instinct. They may be exhilarated - but are 
they not also deceived? As Iris Murdoch says, "It is 
obviously, in practice, a delicate moral problem to 
decide how far the will can coerce the formed personality 
(move in a world it cannot see) without merely occasioning 
disaster " ( SoG 3 9). A balance must be struck between 
a total denial of will and identification with matter 
on the one hand, and deification of the will on the 
other; because both extremes reflect an arrogant contempt 
for the individual. We find this contempt, I believe, 
in Simone Weil's writings: 
"The forgiveness of injuries done to us by 
others is the giving up of our own personality. 
I should give up everything that I call "me" 
without exception, knowing that in what I 
call "me" there is nothing, not a single 
psychological trait, which exterior 
circumstances could not make disappear. I 
should accept this and be happy that it should 
be so." (AD 225) 
JO 
u It is impossible to believe without being 
forced to by some experience, that everything 
in one's soul all the thoughts, all the 
feelings, all the attitudes held towards ideas, 
men and the universe, and especially the most 
intimate attitude of the being towards himself 
all these are completely at the mercy of 
circumstances Believing this with all 
one's soul is what Christ called not what 
we normally 
self-denial 
translate as renounciation or 
self-negation, and it is the 
condition for deserving to be his disciple.~ 
(PCAD 113) 
Simone Weil could not have said more plainly that she 
believed the self to be of two parts, as did Descartes, 
and one more important than the other. The natural 
part of us is contingent on our created state, which 
Simone Weil believed was offensive to God, and distinct 
from the divine uncreated part of us which is God himself, 
reverting to him at death while the created part of 
us perishes. ("Tragic and hopeless" 3 is how Georges 
Fr~naud described this point of view, but there cannot 
be any doubt that Simone held it.) We cannot will our 
own salvation- this is why the idea of a lay morality 
is absurd (AD 191). 
Simone Weil believed that all good which is absolutely 
pure is independent of the will and transcendent (PG 
59) and Susan Taubes rightly thinks she has an obsession 
with purity. Simone's argument is briefly this, that 
nothing can have as destination what it does not already 
contain, the implication of which is that we are trapped 
in our human condition which our faculty of intelligence 
allows us to see as wretched but from which our human 
capacities alone can offer us no means of escape. She 
writes that "Every human being has probably had in his 
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life several moments when he admitted honestly to himself 
that there is nothing good here below. But as soon 
as one has seen this truth one covers it with lies. 
Many people even enjoy announcing it, trying to find 
a morbid pleasure in sadness, when really they have 
not been able to face up to it for more than a second 11 
(AD 210). And, further, " no one is satisfied for 
long with 
something 
only need 
living 
else. 
not to 
purely and simply. 
One wants to live 
lie to ourselves 
One always wants 
for something. We 
to know that there 
is nothing here below for which one can live 11 
14). 
(PCAD 
It never seemed to occur to Simone Weil that this despair, 
for which there is no lack of evidence and some reason, 
might not like any other sickness have causes and cures 
within our control to a greater or lesser extent. Instead 
she took it out of its his tori cal context the fact 
that it had a beginning and so might have an end - and 
incorporated it, universalised, into her theology. 
It would seem, then, that all our supposed pleasures 
and satisfactions are empty, but as we cannot bear this 
terrible knowledge we deceive ourselves into thinking 
otherwise. And it is this self- deception that blinds 
us to the truth that salvation is possible through grace 
alone; grace is the unique source of salvation and this 
salvation comes from God and not from man (SG 79). 
How are we to receive this grace? Or to formulate the 
problem in another way, how do we bring out the spiritual 
side of our nature which Simone Weil is sure we all 
possess, the proof of which is our ability to form general 
ideas (SG 106)? We must make the first move but it 
is an unusual kind of move in that is purely mental 
and is not accompanied or need not be accompanied 
by any resolution to behave in a different kind of 
way. Simone Weil describes it as a withdrawal: as God 
withdrew to make way for us so we must withdraw to make 
way for him. Desire is the key; so she argues that 
"'The effort by which the soul saves itself resembles 
that by which we look~ that by which we listen~ that 
. "' by which a flancee says yes. It is an act of attention 
and of consent. On the other hand what is spoken of 
as will is something analogous to muscular effort " 
(AD 189). 
Simone Weil's mistrust of our animal nature is so profound 
that its part in salvation has to be minimised. Only 
pure intelligence~ functioning 
interests and desires~ can help 
by bringing home to us our true 
and by being the tool for that 
which can bridge the gap between 
Hence Simone Weil's belief in the 
independently of our 
us achieve salvation 
state of wretchedness 
exercise of attention 
the self and reality. 
importance of study, 
and accusations that her theology is too cerebral and 
rational. She would seem to have denied this, when 
she wrote that "After months of inner darkness I was 
struck once and for all by the certainty that any human 
being, however ungifted, can enter this kingdom of truth 
reserved for genius if only he desires the truth and 
makes a continual effort of attention to reach it " 
(AD 39). Yet the Platonic influence remains dominant 
and gives weight to Charles Moeller's accusation that 
instead of illuminating Greece by Christ as she claimed 
to do, Simone Weil illuminated Christ by Greece. 4 
Perhaps one reason why Iris Murdoch finds Simone Weil' s 
thought attractive is that she too, as a Platonist, 
remains within that tradition which produced Descartes 
and existentialism, and which separates mind from body 
with the result that moral philosophy remains theoretical 
and bloodless. As we shall see, Mary Midgley wants 
to restore the practical force of moral discussion by 
relating it to human personality. 
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P A R T T W 0 
I The character of moral dilemmas 
To illumine the view of moral philosophy to which Iris 
Murdoch finds Simone Weil such an effective antidote 
we should look more closely at the moral "ought" in 
an attempt to understand the distinguishing features 
of a moral dilemma. Taking various kinds of prescriptive 
statements and testing them against each other leads 
us straight away to ask the question, Why is this a 
moral "ought" while this is only a prudential one? 
The answer must be that no recommendation on how to 
act which is based solely on considerations of 
effectiveness for achieving a certain end, whether good, 
bad or indifferent, can be classified as a moral 
imperative. Prudential "oughts" deal exclusively with 
means: practical, unambitious, they raise more questions 
than they answer. If I say to someone "You ought to 
water that plant" am I saying anything more than "If 
you do not water that plant it will not flourish"? 
Clearly I am not, and the inference from what is the 
case to what ought to be done is unproblematic; whether 
or not the plant's owner wants it to flourish will be 
the deciding factor in whether or not the plant is 
watered, but that is a consideration which is beyond 
the scope of the prudential ought. But if I say to 
someone "You ought to spend more time with that child 
or he will not flourish" am I saying anything more than 
"If you do not spend more time with that child he will 
not flourish"? Well, yes and no: no, because I am not 
introducing any more factual information; yes, because 
I am introducing an element of the psychological pressure 
with which "ought" is invested when used to convey 
obligation. We are not obliged to water our plants, 
only wise to do so if we want them to flourish; "ought" 
in this context is an invitation to take reasonable 
action, with the "wanting" giving a justification for 
the derivation of a statement about what ought to be 
done from a statement about what is the case. Implicit 
in the notion of wanting something is the willingness 
to take whatever (reasonable) steps are necessary to 
achieve that end. This, after all, is what "wanting" 
means: if I say that I want to pass my examinations 
but at. the same time refuse to do any work for them, 
then it is certainly pertinent to ask whether I really 
do want to pass my exams. This is assuming, of course, 
that I have a properly integrated personality, but given 
this background of purposefulness and rationality, "ought" 
in its non-moral sense functions very smoothly, and 
indeed we would be at a loss without it. 
The moral "ought" is different, though as with the 
prudential "ought" we use it as a kind of shorthand; 
however, what it is shorthand for is rather more 
complicated. When I suggest to someone that they water 
their plant I am merely making a recommendation, that 
is, passing on information that plants need water 
if they are to flourish - and spurring them on to act 
at the same time. When I suggest to someone that he 
should treat his children differently - in a way which, 
in my view, is better - then, not only am I making a 
recommendation but I am also, as G. E. M. Anscombe 
says, giving a verdict on the behaviour of this person 
according to whether or not it is in line with the 
recommendation I have made. 1 Therein lies the 
psychological force of the moral "ought" which is also 
its distinguishing feature. 
Both Iris Murdoch and Elizabeth Anscombe believe that 
this force - if it is truly a force for the good - must 
arise out of some state of affairs, and not simply be 
an extension of our own will. To this extent they are 
both naturalists. Miss Anscombe' s thesis is that this 
for'ce derives from the divine law conception of ethics 
and that in the hands of those who no longer subscribe 
to this conception it is potentially corrupting. It 
was Hume who publicised the problem of passing from 
"is" to "morally ought" and discovered the situation 
in which the notion of obligation survived, and the 
not ion "ought" was invested with "that peculiar force 
having whicb it is said to be used in a 'moral' sense, 
although the belief in divine law had long since been 
abandoned 112 Anscombe agrees with Hume that the 
concept of moral obligation has outlived the system 
of thought within which it made sense. Her radical 
conclusion is that the notion "morally ought" has no 
real content in a society which has ceased to believe 
in God as a law-giver, and that we should try to do 
without it. (Iris Murdoch is similarly worried by the 
empty, formal character of the moral "ought" which she 
seeks to revive by relating it to belief in a 
transcendental good.) She believes that it can only 
be retained at a price which is dangerously high, and 
that modern moral philosophy has paid that price. In 
other words the judgements "morally right" and "morally 
wrong" have been cut off from their roots which lie 
in the Hebrew-Christian ethic, and are now functioning 
as free-floating labels which can be pinned at will 
to 
by 
any 
the 
description of a course of action considered 
individual to warrant this mark of approval or 
disapproval; and this decision must be made according 
to an estimation of the likely consequences of an action, 
there being no other criterion left to us. Now, a 
consequential is t theory of ethics requires a clear 
definition of intention and Anscombe believes that one 
such has been provided which has proved very influential. 
She states it thus: "it does not make any difference 
to a man's responsibility for an effect of his action 
which he can foresee, that he does not intend it". 4 
That is to say, we are excused blame for the bad 
consequences of actions which we expected would have 
good consequences, and therefore deemed "morally right", 
provided we make clear that we did not foresee them; 
conversely, we can take no credit for the good but 
unforeseen consequences of our actions. This all seems 
very austere, which is probably why we have the impression 
remarked on by Miss Anscombe of being edified - a false 
impression in her opinion. It is this very stress on 
hum~n ratiopality and autonomy which she believes to 
be potentially corrupting. She notes that "it is pretty 
well taken for obvious among them all [English academic 
moral philosophers since Sidgwick] that a prohibition 
such as that on murder does not operate in the face 
of some consequences. But of course the strictness 
of the prohibition has as its point that you are not 
to be tempted by fear or hope of consequences". 5 The 
temptation is to take the law into our own hands, that 
is, and it is to this temptation says Elizabeth Anscombe 
that the "liberation" of the concept of being morally 
obliged has allowed us to succumb. 
If asked, then, to state the distinguishing feature 
of a moral dilemma we must answer by referring to the 
"something else" which is not present in any situation 
of conflict which can be resolved by finding out a 
sufficient number of facts, be they "hard" facts about 
the behaviour of concrete objects in the world, "soft" 
facts about the way people feel, or truths which can 
be known a priori. This does not seem to be a very 
helpful discovery, but perhaps it is important to know 
what moral dilemmas are not about. It is important 
to Iris Murdoch and Elizabeth Anscombe, both of whom 
think that the mundane approach of modern moral 
philosophers is made inevitable by the use of a conceptual 
scheme in which there is no place for that "something 
else". I think that their arguments are to some extent 
complementary and this is a point I should like to 
explore. At any rate, they share a point of departure: 
a deep dissatisfaction with the present state of moral 
philosophy. In her paper "Modern Moral Philosophy" 
Miss Anscombe has argued that it is impossible that 
an ethical proposition can be really understood in terms 
of facts alone, and that by retaining the moral "ought" 
when they do not in fact attribute any content to it, 
modern moral philosophers confuse the issue, to say 
the least. 
Linguistic analysis can do much to sort out this confusion 
simply by revealilng its own inability to encompass 
the moral scene; both Anscombe and Murdoch comment on 
the shallowness of their opponents' views: of particular 
importance is Miss Anscombe's assessment that " 
it has in fact been the mark of all these philosophers 
that they have been extremely conventional; they have 
nothing in them by which to revolt against the 
conventional standards of their sort of people; it is 
impossible that they should be profound. But the chance 
that a whole range of conventional standards will be 
decent is small". 6 Unfortunately, what has happened 
is that linguistic analysis has become a substitute 
for the discussion of ethics rather than a mere tool, 
if an important one, for making that discussion better 
informed. And this substitution has been carried out 
in an underhand kind of way, with moral philosophers 
reluctant to admit that something has been lost in the 
process. (Iris Murdoch notes how many of G. E. Moore's 
philosophical beliefs would be considered unstatable 
by his successors ( SoG 63 ). This reluctance is 
evident in the kind of cheating whereby moral philosophers 
try to have their cake and eat it: they deny that there 
is anything special about moral propositions qua 
propositions while expecting them to have a special 
kind of effect on the listener, the kind of effect that 
a proposition containing a prudential "ought" could 
never have. At any rate this is Miss Anscombe's view: 
" I should judge that Hume and our present-day 
ethicists had done a considerable service 
by showing that no content could be found 
in the notion 'morally ought'; if it were 
not that the latter philosophers try to find 
an alternative (very fishy) content and to 
retain the psychological force of the term 
It would be a great improvement, if, 
insteag of 'morally wrong', one always named 
a genus as 'untruthful' , 'unchaste' , 'unjust' . 
We should no longer ask whether doing something 
was 'wrong', passing from some description 
of an action to this notion; we should ask 
whether, e.g., it was unjust; and the answer 
would sometimes be clear at once~7 
Both these points find an echo in the work of Iris 
Murdoch; that is, modern moral philosophy is shallow 
because it offers an analysis of ordinary mediocre 
behaviour instead of addressing itself to its true task 
of investigating how we can become better; it is dishonest 
because its supposed neutrality is no such thing: 
"Linguistic analysis claims simply to give 
a philosophical description of the human 
phenomenon of morality, without making any 
moral judgements. In fact the resulting picture 
of human conduct has a clear moral bias. 
The merits of linguistic analytical man are 
freedom (in the sense of detachment, 
rationality), responsibility, sel~wareness, 
sincerity, and a lot of utilitarian common 
sense." (SaG 49) 
Like Miss Anscombe, Iris Murdoch is suspicious of blanket 
moral terms like "right" and "wrong" which she sees 
being used as indicators of personal preference - movable 
labels which exist for the convenience of the individual 
understood as a moral being by virtue of his ability 
to act. They tell us nothing about, on the one hand, 
the facts of the situation in which the judgement about 
how it is right to act must be made, and on the other, 
the workings of the agent's mind which culminated, or 
perhaps did not, in action. To the question, "Do these 
things matter?" Iris Murdoch replies emphatically, 
"Yes". It is because they matter so much that we need 
to cultivat~ a rich normative 
to talk about them. She agrees 
vocabulary with which 
with Anscombe that we 
could very well do without those moral words with 
descriptive content: 
•• Since the existentialist-behaviourist view 
wished to conceive of will as pure movement 
separated from 
of the use of 
reason and to deprive reason 
normative words (since it was 
to be 'objective'), the moral agent so envisaged 
could get along, was indeed almost forced 
to get along, with only the most empty and 
general moral terms such as 'good' and 'right' 
On my view it might be said that, per 
contra, the primary general words could be 
dispensed with entirely and all moral work 
could be done by the secondary specialised 
words. If we picture the agent as compelled 
by obedience to the reality he can see, he 
will not be saying 'This is right', i.e. 'I 
choose to do this', he will be saying 'This 
is A B C D' (normative~scriptive words), 
and action will follow naturally.w (SoG 42) 
no 
Both Anscombe and Murdoch find Kantian ethics at the 
root of the trouble, with its introduction of the notion 
of man as legislator: the Kantian man must even decide 
for himself whether to adopt Christ as an example of 
moral perfection and this he does by testing Christ 
against a paradigm case of moral rectitude with which 
he is supplied by his own powers of reason. However, 
there is no reason on earth why I should not override 
my own authority; I may in moments of lucidity form 
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guiding principles with the intention of regulating 
my future conduct in accordance with them, but if I 
decide to modify or altogether abandon a principle there 
can be no comeback. In this atmosphere of 
self-determination it is easy to understand the 
existentialist insistence that it is what actually happens 
in the world that rna t ters, not the men tal adj us tmen ts 
which precede events. Mental events such as the framing 
of a principle and subsequently abandoning it may take 
place without so much as the smallest 
the physical world, so if they are not 
disturbance 
translated 
to 
into 
action are we to allow them 
existentialist, (I think it is 
any significance? The 
fair to call Kantian 
man an existentialist) not only denies purely mental 
events significance, he denies them existence. That 
is, values only come into existence with the making 
of 
has 
choices, 
from its 
and the inner life takes what 
outer manifestations. This is 
reality it 
consistent 
with the notion that we cannot be bound by our own 
legislation, or to put it another way, that there can 
be no pre-existing model on which to base behaviour. 
This is of course the case if we are not prepared to 
accept either a divine law theory of ethics or a 
quas:i!Aristotelian 'golden mean' theory dependent on 
the belief that we have a nature or a variation on 
one of these. It follows from this that the chief 
existentialist good is the exercise of freedom, a coming 
fresh to every point of decision untrammelled by 
considerations, which if taken seriously, might compromise 
the purity of my decision. Not that I do not consider 
the facts before I act, for failure to do so would result 
only in displays of irresponsibility. The point is 
rather that I the agent can stand back and from 
a vantage point outside the world in which my action 
is going to take effect, take stock and make my choice 
from a posit ion of logical independence of the factors 
which will have to be taken into consideration if I 
am to be seen to be acting responsibly. Again, the 
gulf between what 
case is shown to 
not think either 
argue with this. 
is the case and what ought to be the 
be unbridgeable by logic; but I do 
Miss Anscombe or Iris Murdoch would 
Their thesis is that although logj_c 
has something to do with moral reasoning, it certainly 
has not got everything to do with it. 
1. G. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy", 220. 
2. ibid, 218. 
3. ibid, 222. 
4. ibid, 223. 
5. ibid, 223. 
6. ibid, 226. 
7. ibid, 220. 
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II Moral dilemmas and freedom 
I •t~ould like at this point to say some thing about the 
notion of freedom, which seems to be crucial. The 
ex :L s tent ial is t, Anglo-Saxon tradition in moral philosophy 
understands freedom as the absence of physical and 
psychological impediments to act ion; I am free in the 
ideal sense when I am fully aware of all my options 
and of what I am doing and why. Now paradoxically the 
exercise of free choice is conditional upon the existence 
of a tight network of secondary causes; for example, 
the absence of any necessary link between thought and 
action can reduce man to a state of slavery. So Simone 
Weil points out that 
" 
..... a fisherman who battles against the 
tides and the wind in his little boat, even 
though he suffers from cold, from fatigue, 
from lack of leisure and even of sleep, from 
danger, from a primitive standard of living, 
has a more enviable fate than the worker at 
the conveyor belt who is nonetheless better 
off on all three scores. The point is that 
his work resembles far more the work of a 
free man .... " (OL 112). 
Despite her critique of Cartesianism, here is one 
interesting point of connection between Simone Weil 
and Mary Midgley. 
Simone Weil was troubled by what she considered the 
very grave problem of workers' alienation from modern 
industrial production methods which denied them the 
satisfaction of conceiving and carrying through to its 
fulfilment a plan of action. Such is the industrial 
worker's sense of estrangement from his labour, she 
says, that 
accomplished 
"In general, the 
and the money 
rapport 
received 
between 
is so 
the work 
difficult 
to grasp that it seems almost 
that the work seems like 
favour " (OL 154). 
contingent, with the result 
slavery, the money like a 
A free society is not a society 
h:-ippen at random, unexplained and in 1.•rhich things 
unconnected; nor is a man who makes decisions by flipping 
a coin, free. 'I'he true exercise of freedom is dependent 
on at least a degree of knowledge about the context 
in which the choice is being made, the higher the degree 
the better. I do not think it is misleading to think 
of knowledge as revealing the interconnectedness of 
everything, a mapping out of territory in which each 
point stands in a certain relation to every other point. 
'I'his terri tory is our home and the more deeply rooted 
we are in it through the exercise of all our human 
capacities the more knowledge we can be said to have 
of it and ourselves. This interaction of man with his 
fellows and his environment is bound to create a culture, 
the existence of which Mary Midgley argues is essential 
to freedom: 
" We are capable of far more than we can fit 
into even the richest individual life-span. 
We have to choose. It is this enormous 
enriching of our capacities that gives rise 
to free will. Since there is much more on 
the table than we could possibly eat, we have 
to choose, in a sense in which other species 
do not. Much of our choosing, however, is 
communal rather than individual. Some of 
it has to be done for us by our parents and 
their generation, before we are in any position 
to advise them. To look at it another way, 
we have to choose for our children as well 
as for ourselves, and also, since we can 
influence others, in part for those around 
us too. 
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Romantic individualism is wrong if it suggests 
that we can choose alone. To choose at all 
(rather than just flipping a coin), we need 
intelligible alternatives. And they can be 
provide.d only by a culture, that is, by an 
unseen host of collaborators. Culture is 
necessary to make rational choi-ce possible. 
It is the condition of freedom~l 
Though Iris Murdoch has set herself up as a critic of 
the existentialist approach to moral philosophy, she 
can never, as a Pla ton is t, be as thorough-going in her 
condemnation as Mary Midgley, who does not subscribe 
in the slightest degree to that tradition which 
distinguishes the ghost from the machine. But it is 
easy to see that in a philosophical structure which 
isolates the moment of choice from the background against 
which that choic~ is made, and accords it a special 
hardness and reality, the self comes to be identified 
with the will. 
There are two reasons why this view is so appealing. 
Firstly, because it dispenses with the need for the 
problematical entities which Iris Murdoch calls 
"introspectabilia• to be taken into account when the 
moral balance sheet is being drawn up; mental concepts 
are related to overt actions in a way that is shadowy 
and parasitic, 
assessment than 
Murdoch traces 
with 
the 
this 
no 
wrong 
line 
more claim to independent 
side of a tapestry. Iris 
of reasoning to its source 
in Wittgenstein's argument against a private language. 
Let us say that I experience a certain sensation SI 
which is new to me and which I cannot identify; six 
months later I experience a certain sensation S2 which 
I am inclined to identify with SI. But how can I be 
sure that they are the same when there is no public 
criterion according to which I can place SI and S2 in 
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a context which would allow comparison one with the 
other? I may think that SI and S2 are identical but 
I can never knmv because I can never check; knowledge, 
so runs the theory, is only worthy of the name by virtue 
of its being publicly verifiable, therefore we cannot 
have knowlepge of private states of mind. And hence 
the difficulty of recognising sensation SI: the 
objectivity which the concept of recognition demands 
simply is not there. It follows from this that the 
real me is 
for in a 
behaviour 
the 
sense 
one 
no 
that appears 
other self 
on the 
exists. 
public stage, 
Language and 
up with each other: are inextricably bound 
I demonstrate my grasp of the meaning of a word by using 
it in situations to which its use is appropriate, and 
if cannot use a word correctly in a consistent way (by 
a fluke I might get it right once or twice) then I do 
not know what it means, for that is the ultimate test. 
As a language user, and by implication a reasonable 
being, I stand or fall by my public performance. It 
is in this sense that the public performing person is 
the real self because this is the only person we can 
know anything about, the one that is activated by force 
of will. And there is a second reason for favouring 
the identification of the self with the will: we admire 
people who have the courage of their convictions, and 
accuse those who do not of a failure to be resolute. 
Fine feelings are all very well, we say, but it is action 
that counts. If my abhorrence of apartheid is genuine, 
what am I doing buying South African goods? I can of 
course argue my case and perhaps win, but the onus is 
on ~~ to square my beliefs with my overt behaviour, 
about which, at least, there can be no doubt. 
Courage 
lack of 
a true 
to go wherever 
hypocrisy which 
representation 
our convictions may take us, 
might prevent us from giving 
of ourselves, and above all 
rationality to enable us to extend the field of our 
responsibility as widely as possible these are the 
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marks of the Kantian man and his existentialist 
descendent, and the most striking features of that picture 
of human personality which Iris Murdoch deplores. In 
her essay 11 The Idea of Perfection 11 (contained in SoG) 
she argues the 
nf lool;cing 
case for standing the existentialist 
OAibkud 
at things,~ we move from the posit ion 
... 
where private sensations are nothing more than the shadow 
of a public action to one in which public actions pale 
in significance against the stream of moral consciousness 
which is the necessary precondition of their ever taking 
shape. 
At this point it might be a good idea to try to clarify 
the relative positions of Iris Murdoch and her adversaries 
by looking at the kind of question to which they have 
addressed themselves and found such very different 
answers. A fundamental one must surely be: Does goodness 
have to be knowable? Well, yes it does, replies the 
existentialist, because there is no distinction which 
can be made between being good and being seen to be 
good this follows as we have seen from the 
anti-metaphysical 
It is not that 
stance of the existentialist wing. 
the existentialist believes that from 
time to time we erupt into activity which is alternated 
with stretches of quasi-unconsciousness, for no one 
could seriously hold this belief. It is, rather, a 
question of what matters, or counts, and here the 
existentialist is unequivocal: doing counts. Again 
this is rather austere - not for nothing do practising 
existentialists have to be brave. They create values 
through their own choices, and alone and without guidance 
they must do the best they can using the one tool at 
their disposal, rationality. In a world without God 
they create their own heaven or hell. 
Iris Murdoch, on the other hand, would not consider 
the 
be 
question, 
very much 
Does goodness 
to the point, 
have to be knowable? to 
though I think she would 
answer "no". Her concern 
or misunderstood as 
is not with goodness understood 
the incidental by-product of 
a certain conjunction of circumstances, but with goodness 
understood as a state of being which should be the aim 
of every individual, and which is attainable only through 
a ~radual and deepening understanding of love and its 
attendant virtues. In reply to the 
behavlourist-existentialist argument against the 
possibility of identifying 
probably concede the point 
acquantiance with a concept 
inner events, she would 
that we make our initial 
in the public arena - that 
is how we learn the minimum necessary to recognise concept 
A as that concept and no other one. And it is also 
true that conceptual muddle will only be exposed and 
resolved in a public way. However, that is not to say 
that having once grasped the public character of a concept 
we cannot develop our understanding of that concept 
in a private way, and that while the results of this 
deepened understanding may find a public expression, 
they might equally well not Whether they do or not, 
says Iris Murdoch, is not all that much to the point 
because the essentially 
individual is constantly 
is not dependent on its 
the form of action. 
private 
engaged 
eventual 
activity 
in has a 
public 
v1hich the 
value which 
unveiling in 
What Iris Murdoch is challenging is the "genetic analysis 
of mental concepts", which is recognizable by this kind 
of reasoning: 
ff This is really red if several people agree about 
the description, indeed this is what being really 
red means. He really decided, roughly, if people 
agree that he kept the rules of the concept 
'dec ide' . To decide means to keep these rules 
and the agent is not the only judge. Actions 
are 'moving things about 1n the public world' , 
and what these movements are objective observers 
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are actually and potentially at hand to decide." 
(SoG 24) 
N mv , no t on l y i s t hi s no t the whole s tory , she argue s , 
but in being less than the truth it is a serious 
distortion of it, because it leaves us with a picture 
of human nature which is not compatible with the exercise 
of moral competence as Iris Murdoch understands it. 
We can now look more closely at that understanding, 
having seen that it is born out of a belief that the 
moral agent cannot live entirely in a hard, impersonal 
world bounded by rules of logic. For one thing, there 
is no place in this world for an individual's history, 
and it surely cannot be denied that what decides our 
moral actions, and what in Iris Murdoch's view makes 
them moral, (her "something else") is not only the 
way in which the facts in that hard, impersonal world 
are arrayed, but the kind of people we are. And the 
kind of people we are is to some extent at least, a 
function of our individual histories. 
Now once the historical individual is "let in" a number 
of things have to be said with a difference. The idea 
of "objective reality", for instance, undergoes important 
modifications when it is to be understood, not in relation 
to "the world described by science", but in relation 
to the progressing life of a person. The active 
"reassessing" and "redefining" which is a main 
characteristic of live personality, often suggests and 
demands a checking procedure which is a function of 
an individual history. Repentance may mean something 
different to an individual at different times in his 
life, and what it fully means is a part of this life 
and cannot be understood except in context (SoG 26). 
In other words, the genetic analysis of meaning does 
not work for value concepts because "Knowledge of a 
value concept is something to be understood, as it were, 
51 
in depth, and not in terms of switching on to some given 
impersonal network " (SoG 29). 
The link between virtue and knowledge is therefore a 
strong theme in Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy and 
i t, n m s c: o 1_m t e r to the demo c r a t i c ex i s ten t i a l i s t v i e w 
within everybody's 
perfect ion and good 
is always beyond 
worth striving 
our 
for. 
that good behaviour is easily 
capability. Introduce the idea of 
behaviour becomes something that 
reach while being immeasurably 
Iris Murdoch believes that the key moral concept is 
do not talk about, and 
manifests itself in a 
love, 
that 
which 
in a 
the existentialists 
moral context, love 
quality of attention whose linguistic face is a normative 
vocabulary of increasing richness and subtlety. To 
look with love is to perceive and acknowledge fine 
distinctions. Here she is very close to SiGone Weil 
and she specifically states this in her essay "The Idea 
of Perfection" (SoG 34). Simone Weil' s theory of 
attention is discussed on Page ~u~ but I shall mention 
here what I think has attracted Iris Murdoch to it, 
that is, the idea of pure attention as revealing things 
as they really are and not as we, in our weakness, would 
have them be. Thus morality is removed from the realm 
of the personal and, by implication, from the realm 
of corruption. In the example Iris Murdoch gives of 
the mother and daughte~in-law (see page 101), this respect 
for the truth, for that is what she claims loving 
attention is, proceeds by way of a more discerning use 
of concepts: for example, vulgarity gives way to 
simplicjty, lack of dignity to spontaneity etc. Of 
course no one can guarantee the correctness of these 
individual acts of reappraisal, but that does not alter 
the fact that the s ubj ec t is engaged in an effort to 
be just. This picture of moral activity presents a 
challenge to the belief in a sharp distinct ion be tween 
the hard impersonal world of facts, knowable by the 
intellect, and the hazy shadow world of the emotions 
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which is supposedly subservient to it. For it shows 
that a degree of subjectivity or inwardness is essential 
to any real understanding of that world of facts: there 
is no objectivity without subjectivity discerning 
the truth about things makes heavy personal demands 
which could. not be met by ::1 being cast entirely in the 
existentialist mould. He simply would not have the 
resources. 
Having outlined Iris 
existentialist tradition 
which it has so much 
Elizabeth Anscombe, she 
Murdoch's objections to 
(and the Anglo-Saxon one 
in common) we note that 
finds it not simply amoral 
the 
with 
like 
but 
immoral. This she makes perfectly clear when she ends 
her passage on the distinguishing characteristics of 
the Kant ian man with these words: "In fact Kant's man 
had already received a glorious incarnation nearly a 
century earlier in the work of Mil ton: his proper name 
is Lucifer " ( SoG 8 0) • The difference between Iris 
Murdoch's objections and those of Miss Anscombe seem 
to centre on the kind of person the existentialist 
believes the moral agent to be, while Miss Anscom be's 
object ions are directed against a philosophical sys tern. 
Of course the two things are connected: the Kantian 
man 
end 
is devilish 
to justify 
because he may on occasion allow the 
the means. As we saw, insofar as 
expediency is concerned, the end does provide a complete 
justification of the means provided of course that 
they are within the law - because by definition he who 
wills the end wills the means. This is a logical point 
which does not apply in the case of moral decisions, 
i.e., those decisions which concern ends which can only 
be achieved at some human cost, whether actual or 
possible. 
we can, so 
Now 
to 
Iris 
speak, 
Murdoch appears to 
be good from the 
believe that 
inside out 
kind 
and 
of here she is very 
spontaneity which 
it to be possible. 
close to Simone Weil on the 
characterises good behaviour assuming 
This is of course consistent with 
a debunking of the theory that 
ultimately in the will expressed 
as a needle, appears in the quick 
will " (SoG 53). 
personhood resides 
as "The agent, thin 
flash of the chaos ing 
If ':!e 2."!."e ~o 0rrppt that the moral choices we make are 
far more dependent on the state of our substantial selves 
than the existentialist would have us believe, it is 
important that we should look for an answer to the 
question which Iris Murdoch puts thus: "Are there 
techniques 
an energy 
that when 
of acting 
for the purification and reorientation 
which is naturally selfish, in such a 
moments of choice arrive we shall be 
rightly " ( SoG 54)! As the answer to 
any 
of 
way 
sure 
this 
question emerges it will become clear to what extent, 
unlike Simone Weil, she is advocating a theism without 
God. I think that Elizabeth Anscombe's position is 
more straightforward: like Iris Murdoch she is troubled 
by the disappearance of moral absolutes which she believes 
originated in divine law - and are to be found nowhere 
else. If we are to dispense with the absolutes we should 
be honest and dispense with moral principles altogether, 
rather than attempt to base them on the results of half-
baked juggling with expected consequences. Iris Murdoch 
is not so uncompromising; she believes that the 
transcendence of the good can be salvaged by an appeal 
to something like our spirituality. It could be said 
that she is engaged in a reductionist account of Simone 
Weil, from whom she has taken the idea of the self and 
its demands as obstacles to purity, but whose theological 
system she implicitly rejects. 
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PART THREE 
I Moral philosophy and spirituality: "decreation" 
Before exam~ning 
believes we can 
the techniques by which Iris 
purify and reorientate this 
Murdoch 
selfish 
energy we possess, we should perhaps 1 ook more closely 
at the Weilian idea of "decreation", which is 
self-forgetfulness taken to an extreme point, and at 
its implications. The decreated man is detached "from 
everything which is good and everything which constitutes 
our reason for living" (SG 85) because attachment "is 
a creator of 
be detached n 
illusions and whoever seeks reality must 
(PG 20). This detachment is hard to 
distinguish from indifference or impartiality and is 
a form of mental hygiene designed to make us open to 
grace. The danger of attachment is that it alltlWs us 
to substitute temporal goods for eternal ones; Hilary 
Ottensmeyer says that we create illusions about the 
things around us by giving them a value which should 
only be accorded to the absolute good, which is God. 
It is, he says, a question of calling things by their 
true names.l This is right; we should not worship false 
gods. But the idea that we can get back to first 
principles emotionally as we can attempt to do 
intellectually seems to me suspect. We are naturally 
attached and suffer from not being able to form 
attachments. I think this is an example of Simone Weil's 
asceticism - certainly not a bad thing in itself (quite 
the reverse for certain people ir: certain circumstances) 
provided the subject is fully aware of the implications. 
I think what Mary Midgley has to say about asceticism 
is relevant here: 
" There evidently are many people of Existentialist leanings 
around who think the ability to stand alone is an 
absolutely central part of human dignity. They value 
individuality so highly that they want to do away with 
any institution that tends to entangle us with each 
other, to make us say 'we' rather than ' I' Thus they 
regard family life as self-indulgent and would like 
to get rid of it. The first thing to say about this 
position is that the genujne form of it must be 
distinguished from a confidence trick often played in 
its name, whereby people who are frightened of human 
contact, and cannot deal with it, denounce it as se If-
indulgent and congratulate themselves on their ability 
to live without it. That said, however, no doubt some 
real neo-Stoics remain. And their position is this: 
they are proposing an ascetic way of life, a renunciation 
of things commonly wished for and taken as part of the 
human bargain..... There is nothing unnatural about 
such ascetic ism - nothing we need o bj ec t to - provided 
that no lies are told about it. The cost must be admitted 
as a real cost, and nobody should be asked to join in 
without full and informed understanding of this fact~2 
I do not know if Simone Weil would have agreed that 
there was any such price to pay, but I do think that 
she was proposing the kind of existentialist asceticism 
which Mary Midgley is talking about and I think that 
in Simone's case it was linked with a certain intellectual 
rigour which prevented her from taking anything on trust. 
The most obvious example of this was her attitude to 
her own baptism into the Catholic church: "Christ is 
happy that we should prefer to know the truth rather 
than him because before being Christ he is the truth. 
If we turn away from him to go towards the truth we 
will not go far without falling into his arms" (AD 46). 
Jean de la Croix Kaelin does not think that Simone Weil 
is right to play with the idea of a hypothetical conflict 
between Christ and the truth; he challenges the notion 
of intellectual freedom carried to this point. 3 Perhaps 
we do deceive ourselves in thinking that the intellectual 
57 
capacities we possess can be isolated from our other 
human traits, and that "The spirit is not obliged to 
believe in the existence of anything (subjectivism ..... ). 
This is why the only organ of contact with existence 
is acceptance, love. This is why beauty and reality 
are identical. This is why .ioy and the feeling of reality 
are identical II (PG 8 2). 
There is plenty of evidence for this subjectivism in 
Simone Weil's writing; firstly 
pays no attention to Christian 
in her syncretism which 
orthodoxy while showing 
a wide knowledge of comparative religion. So Moeller 
has 
for 
remarked 
her the 
on her syncretism: "Religious truth is 
synthesis of every religious truth. 
Christianity, being Catholic, should integrate everything 
in itself, even those traditions such as Manicheanism 
accused of heresy. 
impossible to class 
All religions are good; it i~s 
them in order of worth. They are 
the translation in different languages, by different 
people, of theGreat Revelation."4 Secondly, we find 
her subjectivism in her refusal to accept baptism because, 
after much souJfsearching, she was not able to say with 
certainty that she had received the order from God to 
receive baptism and absolute obedience was what she 
wanted most. For her it was not enough to know that 
representatives of the Church very much wanted her to 
be baptised, nor was she prepared to take one step on 
her own initiative in a direction in which she did not 
feel that she was being irresistibly pushed. A third 
symptom of her subjectivism, or perhaps, more accurately, 
a cause of it, was her inability to grip on to reality, 
in this instance the reality of the resurrection of 
Christ, and hence the uniqueness of Christianity. Charles 
Moeller says that Simone Weil was unable to· accept the 
appearance of God in history, 5 hence her distaste for 
Judaism and loyalty to Platonic idealism. If Victor 
sa 
Gollancz accuses Simone of personalising God too much 
it is because she was unable to personalise Christ. 
In this way what would seem at first sight to be 
liberating ratjonalism turned out in the case of Simone 
Weil to entail a kind of mental enslavement which left 
hPr CJt the l)'lercy of her own, often mistaken, intuitions. 
This is not to say that intuition has no place, only 
that 
that 
it should be open to mod if ica t ion; in this instance 
need might have been met if Simone Weil had had 
a serious spiritual training which, as Pierre Blanchard 
points out, would have allowed her to value the human 
face of the church,6 as well as to see beyond it. Miklos 
" Veto interprets Simone as believing that intelligence 
is the function par excellence, and thus the best 
representative, of the decreated man, 7 whom he defines 
as one who has renounced what is our principal demand 
on the universe, that is, assurance of our own permanence 
and the continuation of our personality.S 
Moreover, she draws a sharp distinction between 
intelligence, and imagination which she understands 
not as the discovery or invention of things which are 
potentially real but the debasement of what is already 
real.9 Imagination distorts; intelligence keeps its 
distance and allows us to see things as they really 
are. So she urges us to "Try to love without imagining. 
Love the appearance itself without interpretation. 
Then what one loves is truly God" ( PG 7 0 ). Here Simone 
Weil and Iris Murdoch are at odds, for as a novelist 
Iris Murdoch is very aware of the value of imagination 
to the artist who is trying through his work to reveal 
some truth about the world. I shall come back to this 
point about the distinction between fantasy, which is 
self-indulgent, 
intelligently 
Ideally, then, 
and imagination, which 
is so very enriching (see 
the intelligence should be 
when used 
page '3 ) . 
a spectator 
rather than a participant, the mark of the man who lives 
not in time but beyond it. In this way Simone Weil 
severs the connection between thinking and doing so 
as to place the springs of our actions outside ourselves. 
Hence the emphasis on the impotence of the will and 
desirability of non-acting action (being irresistably 
pushed). Simone Weil believed that the disembodied 
intelligence let us assume for the time being that 
we can talk meaningfully of disembodied intelligences 
- is purified through passivity. It can be acted upon, 
that is to say, the body with which it is associated 
(which comprises as well the psychic matter of the soul) 
can be acted upon and will react in conformity with 
certain laws concerning the behaviour of people and 
things. Yet the possibility of assertion is denied 
it. Simone WeLL says that we have free will by virtue 
of our in tell igence and that the best use we can make 
of that autonomy is to decide to surrender it: our 
existence is nothing but God's waiting for us to consent 
not to exist (PG 41). Something is therefore demanded 
of us, indeed we have to make the first move, but this 
move is not a kind which is typical of our normal 
interaction with the world. It is purely mental and 
above all passive - the non-acting action to which Simone 
Weil attached so much spiritual significance. 
It was one of her most firmly-held precepts that it 
is God who comes to seek out man and not the other way 
round: "The 
unfathomable 
replace it 
idea of a 
depth and 
by the idea 
quest by God for 
splendour. It is 
of a quest for 
man is of an 
decadence to 
God by man " 
(LR 75). She believed that we corrupt in our imaginations 
whatever has become for us an object of desire this 
is our natural tendency - so that anything we approached 
in the name of God would not be God at all but merely 
a projection of our earthbound needs and desires, a 
form of auto-consolation. This is of course the major 
pitfall of religious subjectivism, that God is trapped 
inside a system of needs, imagination and wish-fulfillment 
which allows misconceptions to abound unchecked. We 
have seen how Simone Weil could not accept the church 
(and consequently the truth of the Christian revelation 
as taught by the church) as an external check on her 
feelings about religion. She may have thought that 
hy rlepriving_ the self of all initiative, of the capacity 
for acting before it is convinced it has no choice, 
she was amongst other things preventing the kind 
of ace iden tal mudd led thinking and wilful se lvdecep t ion 
to which we are certainly prone if we are not given 
guidance or do not acknowledge any external check on 
our fantasises. 
The passive 
perhaps best 
occupied by 
act ion required of the dec rea ted 
be likened to an abandonment of 
the self to make room for the 
self can 
territory 
action of 
grace: "We must give up from love of God the illusory 
power which he gives us to say 'I am' " (CS 31). We 
must be open to God and the key to this openness is 
attention, better understood as waiting with an element 
of longing, than as a kind of strained concentration. 
The problem with this seems to me to be that it is very 
difficult counsel to follow. Simone Weil is demanding 
more than that we should face up to a few home truths 
about ourselves; Miklos Vet~ understands dec rea tion 
as nothing more nor less than self-knowledgelO but for 
this definition to fit, self-knowledge must be given 
a new meaning. It must be understood not as insight 
into the workings of our nature but as acceptance of 
its incidental and fleeting quality. Simone Weil was 
obsessed with the fragility and insecurity of human 
life to the point of stating that we should never think 
of those we love who are absent from us without bearing 
in mind the possibility that they may be dead. The 
problems raised by a division of the world into matter 
and spirit have already been touched on (the major one 
being that it is fundamentally mistaken). The question 
now arises of how a man who has destroyed his links 
with the temporal sphere can be active in it as a force 
for the good. Does not indifference to one's own fate 
result in indifference to the fate of everyone else? 
Simone Weil >'las convinced that this is not so, and that 
indeed indifference to one's own fate is the key to 
the real world of moral perfection: 
" We are in unreality, in a dream state. To give up our 
imaginary situation at the centre of things, not only 
with our minds but also in the imaginative part of our 
souls, is to wake up to the real, to the eternal, to 
see the real light, hear the real silence. A 
transformation takes place at the very root of our 
sen s i t i vi t y , in the way in w hi c h we i mm e d i at e 1 y r e c e i v e 
sense impressions and 
transformation analogous 
the evening on a road 
psychological impressions. 
to that which occurs when 
at the spot where we thought 
A 
in 
we 
had seen a crouching man we suddenly make out a tree 
We see the same colours, we hear the same sounds, 
but not in the same way." (AD 148) 
Simone Weil's theory of decreation is extreme, and, 
because it is meant to be understood literally, smacks 
of fanaticism. 
forgetfulness 
work, but not 
The idea of the moral worth of self-
is certainly 
the distaste 
feature of Simone Weil's own. 
present in Iris 
for self which 
Murdoch's 
is such a 
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II Moral philosophy and spirituality: "attention" 
Once again the now familiar picture emerges of a tiny 
core of int~grity imprisoned in a mesh of selfish fantasy. 
We are irreconcilably at odds with ourselves. The 
breakdown of trust between the two parts of our being 
is so profound that we must admit the hollowness of 
our human at tempts to be good and so to speak hand over 
the reins to God. The problem of how the decreated 
(in human terms impotent) man can act in the world is 
solved if he can be completely identified with God, 
which is in the opinion of Simone Weil our supreme 
calling (AD 14). Choice, conflict, desire, temptation 
indeed any stimuli which may cause us to examine 
ourselves and weigh up the relative importance of things, 
and challenges which make new demands on us - are thus 
relieved of their potentially harmful nature (and many 
would argue, their potentially beneficial nature), for 
with God acting through us we are beyond the possibility 
of choosing evil, in the most literal sense. Simone 
We il wrote that to her, the most beautiful life possible 
had always seemed to be that in which all is determined 
either by force of circumstance, or by impulsions of 
such power that they are clearly not to be res is ted, 
and where there is 
In such a context 
self-fulfilment seem 
no room for any choice 
the ideals of personal 
out of place. So to 
(AD 38). 
growth and 
use Simone 
Weil to illuminate the idea of moral progress is 
problematical, unless one bears in mind that progress 
in her eyes is a stripping away of the personal 
preferences which might distract us from the truth that 
in any moral dilemma there is only one possible course 
of action. 
This re"fversion of the soul to God is not a quick, once 
and for all business but a gradual process in which 
the will and the understanding 
if only a passive one of being 
as understood by Simone Wei l is 
mind which presupposes faith and 
have a part to play, 
attentive. Attention 
a complex attitude of 
love while rejecting 
at the same time any hope of future reward for present 
goodness indeed any kind of attachment which causes 
our state of openness and vulnerability to be less than 
absolutely pure. Attention is voluntary, though the 
fruits of attention must not be thought of as something 
we have produced by our own efforts, but as a gift. 
However, it should not be a strain. Any kind of staring 
concentration will be sel~defeating we only succeed 
in thinking about thinking about nothing: 
ll 
IVJost often we confuse attention with a sort of muscular 
effort. If we say to children: 'Now you are going 
to pay attention', we see them frowning, holding their 
breath, contracting their muse le s. If after two minutes 
we ask them what they've been paying attention to they 
cannot reply. They have not been paying attention to 
anything. They have not been paying attention. They 
have only been contracting their muscles." (AD 90) 
As Simone Weil quite rightly says this kind of attention 
is sterile. Real attention is so closely linked with 
interest (or desire as Simone would prefer to call it) 
that when we are really paying attention we are not 
It 
aware of it; as Miklos Veto says of intelligence, it 
is "quelque chose qui s'efface par le fait qu'elle 
s' exerce" .l Screwing up our courage to do things can 
work for certain kinds of activity. Simone gives as 
an example manual work and this seems to me the obvious 
one; but at another level she believes it can be 
positively harmful for the road to hell is paved with 
good intentions (AD 91). The spirit in which we do 
things matters. This is a crucial point, and I think 
that to understand its significance we need to look 
again at the faculties of reason and will. 
Mary Midgley reminds us of what it 
that reason is not only a logical 
is easy to forget, 
tool which enables 
us to solve highly specific problems, say in the field 
of mathematics, and which can, so to speak, be brought 
out and put. away again when it has served its purpose. 
A broad grasp of the relative importance of things is 
also dependent on its right functioning, with the 
corollary that reason is not a faculty apart but an 
ingredient of the whole man. A rational man can 
the value as well as calculate the price. 2 In 
words rationality is a faculty which hinges 
something else, and Mary Midgley believes that 
judge 
other 
on to 
that 
something else is the intrinsic worth of human life, 
of which the sane man is always conscious. Here she 
differs from Simone Weil to whom the intelligence is 
the only objective trait in our personality, hence its 
value as a tool with which we can lever ourselves from 
the temporal sphere of subjectivity into union with 
God, the eternal. We care about ourselves and the way 
our lives are taking shape, and we experience this concern 
on behalf of others too; we know that by making a wrong 
choice we could do ourselves harm, that the possibility 
of doing violence to oneself is real. Thus understood, 
rationality has not got a great deal to do with 
intelligence: " 1 Reason 1 is not the name of a character 
in a drama. It is the name for organising oneself. 
When there is a conflict, one desire must be restrained 
to make way for the other. It is the process of choosing 
which that is rightly called reasoning." 3 
This view is in direct opposition to that of those modern 
moral philosophers who, in the interests of freedom, 
would isolate the personal choosing will from the 
impersonal thinking machine and deny any suggestion 
of compulsion, a view of intelligence which is as sterile 
as Simone Weil 1 s own. As we have seen, she held the 
most beautiful life possible to be that in which 
6& 
compulsion is present to such an extent that we find 
we have no options; choice from being everything becomes 
nothing. The importance of the will understood as 
standing alone is diminished. In complete contrast 
r!Jary Midgley defines the will as reason in action and 
stresses its personal character: "It is a set of highly 
varied mental capacities, practical and theoretical, 
which are separable and unevenly distributed among human 
beings, and are shaped in specific ways by their lives".4 
According to Mary Midgley reason and will are in practice 
inseparable one from the other; and in this she is 
following Bishop Butler who points out the necessary 
connection between thought and action. Iris Murdoch 
agrees: 
" The place of choice is certainly a different one if 
we think in terms of a world which is compulsively present 
to the will, and the discernment and exploration of 
which is a slow business. Moral change and moral 
achievement are slow; we are not free in the sense of 
being able suddenly to alter ourse 1 ve s since we cannot 
suddenly alter what we can see and ergo what we desire 
and are compelled by. In a way, explicit choice seems 
now less important: less decisive (since much of the 
'decision' lies elsewhere) and less obviously something 
to be 'cultivated'. If I attend properly I will have 
no choices and this is the ultimate condition to be 
aimed at. This is in a way the reverse of [Stuart] 
Hampshire's picture, where our efforts are supposed 
to be C.irected to increasing our freedom by 
conceptualising as many different possibilities of action 
as possible: having as many goods as possible in the 
shop. The ideal picture, on the contrary, is rather 
to be represented as a kind of 'necessity' . This is 
something of which saints speak and which any artist 
will readily understand. 
regard, directed upon a 
presents the will not 
The idea of a patient, loving 
person, a thing, a situation, 
as unimpeded 
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.. 
movement but as something very much more like 'obedience~-
(SoG 39 - 40) 
Iris Murdoch has gone further than Mary Midgley by 
intr-oducing an almost supernatural element - "the right 
thing to do. in any given situation". Here she is very 
close to Simone Weil who says that all good is 
transcendental, though they have reached this conclusion 
by different routes. For Iris Murdoch, having the grace 
to do the right thing is not a spirtual state in the 
way it is for Simone Weil, who sees grace as coming 
only from God. But there is joint agreement on this 
much, that not only does the spirit in which we do things 
rna t ter but that that spirit is an inseparable part of 
the doing; 
in which 
our acts are shaped and defined by the spirit 
they are performed. In this context the kind 
of unse lPconsc ious attention 1t!hi ch Simone We il speaks 
of as being the root of a good action can be understood. 
She cites the example of the good Samaritan: "One person 
stops and pays attention. The acts which follow are 
only the automatic effect of this moment of attention. 
This attention is creative " (AD 133). Simone Weil 
says that the opposite of attention is scorn (AD 141), 
from which it follows that attention, when it is real, 
is necessarily kindly. We are moving away from the 
image of the detached observer - and the neutral stance 
which is so dear to the existentialist and the 
behaviourist, towards a view of man as 
fully conscious, less steadily rational" 
"darker, less 
( SoG 4 3) and 
consequently, more open to the divine grace which 
presupposes a faith which could not by definition be 
part of the make-up of an ideally rational man, though 
this is a point which Simone Weil failed to see. However, 
we should not forget the prescriptive nature of 
reflection, including moral reflection. Mary Midgley 
thinks that Bishop Butler can throw light on this problem 
of accountability: 
n 
Butler's idea is that if we reflect on our own nature, 
if we attend to our neglected outlying motives and relate 
them to the center, we shall be able to judge them -
because the reflective center of our personality has 
a natural ay.thority, is in a position to judge What 
rules us is our own center. It is indeed a 'governor' , 
but not an alien, colonial one. It is our own sense 
of how our nature works By reflecting, Butler says, 
we stumble on the moral law, because that is the law 
of our own nature. 'Your obligation to obey this law 
is, its being the law of your nature.' It is not imposed 
from without He repeatedly points out that it does 
not depend on any religious sanctions, because it is 
more fundamental than they. It is as binding on pagans 
and unbelievers as it is on Christians."+ 
On this point Butler and 
Christianity does not rely 
laws on mere convention. 
accord: Simone Weil are in 
for the force of 
Yet what Butler 
its moral 
and his 
interpreter Mary 
Weil's model of 
Midgley offer us and which Simone 
the decreated (fragmented) self does 
not - is an in tell igi ble and convincing account of that 
force: 
" People are alarmed when Butler speaks of the 11 absolute 
authority" of conscience or reflection over other motives, 
because they smell political despotism But he means 
reflection itself. In a full discussion of 
self-deception, he makes it clear how wrong it is to 
dis tort the term conscience by using it to set up any 
such private oracle What Butler intends is quite 
different. He is pointing out that reflection demands 
action~5 
Simone V.Jeil believes that there is a close link between 
will and attention but not the obvious one of attention 
6' 
being the product 
VJeil believed this 
of will. As we have seen, Simone 
kind of attention to be thoroughly 
self-defeating and worthless. On the contrary, the 
connection is indirect for it is only when we have 
suspended thought, leaving the mind empty and expectant, 
that we can receive, in 
to penetrate it: "Warmth 
will not make up for a 
its truth , the o b j e c l L haL l s 
of heart, impulsiveness, pity 
lack of this kind of attention 
through which alone one can receive into oneself the 
being that one is looking at, 'just as he is, in all 
that it 
religion 
strident 
his truth' . Weil goes so far as to demand 
'be publicly and officially recognised that 
is nothing else but a looking' a curiously 
insistence for one who holds religion to be waiting, 
openness, and receptivity~6 
The sole function of the will is to maintain this attitude 
of having no attitude and the sole function of the 
intelligence is to keep 
of the created state, 
conplete dependence on 
can only do one thing: 
man alert to the wretchedness 
his own powerlessness 
salvation: God for 
look at 
and 
"The 
his 
will 
without throwing itself upon him. 
the beautiful being 
The rest happens 
despite the will" (SG lll). It is worth noting here 
that it is a tenet of the Gnostic tradition that man 
should be aware of his situation, and that he is called 
to return to God. We find Simone Weil writing: "Thus 
every human 
most degraded 
being, without 
of slaves, has 
exception, including 
a soul which comes 
the 
from 
the world situated above the skies, that is to say from 
God, and which is called to return there. The sign 
of this origin and this vocation is the aptitude for 
forming general 
being possesses 
Although she 
ideas 
" 
might 
an aptitude which 
(SG 106). 
every human 
appear to be advocating total 
objectivity, 
be expected 
Simone Weil is not really, because we cannot 
to have obj ec ti ve knowledge of the inherent 
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falseness of the human condition. Our feelings of 
emptiness and dissatisfaction, however acute, will not 
necessarily lead us to adopt the attitude of attentive 
desire which she is prescribing, for though it has 
undoubted emotional and intellectual appeal, and contains 
more than a ljt.tle truth, it is not an attitude which 
is natural. We would have to strive to adopt it - Simone 
never suggests otherwise; but, for this striving to 
be made possible, we would have to know more than we 
are meant to know. Maurice Friedman detects this kind 
of internal contradiction in Simone Weil' s own attitude 
of waiting: 
l1 
There is something paradoxical indeed in the humility 
that leads Weil to a complete denial of self in favour 
of objectivity and at the same time makes possible the 
most dogmatic and intolerant pronouncements on every 
subject. She was herself, like the saint she calls 
for, a genius, and she was anything but humble concerning 
her own intellectual accomplishments. She wished to 
des troy her 'I' and attain the plane of truth and pure 
objectivity. But there is another 'I' which she 
identified with this plane, and so far from denying 
it, she set it no practical limits. She found her 1 I' 
by denying it, found it, in fact, in a much more absolute 
way than would be possible to one who admitted that 
his own subjectivity entered into his relation to the 
truth that he possessed.~ 
Simone believes that if we can still the selfish fantasy 
machine of our own minds, and in the ensuing calm, quiet 
emptiness let our existence be whittled down until it 
is nothing but a waiting on God - then, and only then, 
can God respond by filling the space that we have made 
within ourselves, the void that we have suffered. As 
I have said this is likely to be a gradual process, 
but the point is that our questing must precede God 1 s 
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answer. This is 
the soul in the 
the 
form 
soul that thinks of 
operation of grace, which enters 
of compulsion: "God rewards the 
him with attention and love and 
he rewards it by exercising over it a constraint 
is rigorously, mathematically proportional to 
which 
this 
attention and love" (AD 13). As our spirit is emptied 
of what we of self~nterest so the objective reality 
encounter in the outside world is increased. 
Simone Weil failed to see the distinction between pure 
understood as something much 
that she failed to appreciate 
intelligence, and reason 
closer to sanity. Not 
the li.J'Tiitations of the intelligence she would have 
been the first to point out that theJe is a world of 
difference between intellectual and loving 
of the existence of others. What Simone 
that this intellectual recognition is all 
recognition 
is saying 
that we 
is 
as 
human beings are capable of, and that 
does 
which 
not 
is 
considered 
extend 
such 
as a 
beyond it, into the 
an important concern 
faculty, that is as a 
our intelligence 
field of values 
of reason when 
function which 
derives its force and purposefulness from being part 
of a human whole. Intelligence as understood by Simone 
Weil is an impersonal tool; it is so by definition, 
for were it to reflect individual experience (and thus 
inevitably human aspiration), it would cease to be 
intelligence and become imagination. Thus all recognition 
of truths about values as opposed to truths about facts 
(as we shall see this is in itself a suspect distinction) 
is to be accredited to God's acting through us, because 
the "human intelligence, by its natural limitations, 
is incapable of knowing anything beyond the material 
ac_tual it ies of the physical world in which it lives", 8 
a view which Simone Weil shares with those who seek 
to "neutralise" moral philosophy. This, says Fr~naud, 
is where she really goes wrong: "Only God present in 
us can really think of the wretched as human beings, 
look at them truly, other than in the way that one looks 
. 
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at objects, listen truly to their voices as one listens 
to speech" (AD 137). 
The trouble is that Simone Wei l really means what she 
says, which is much more than that it is beautiful and 
good, and what we sho11lrl hP ::liming at: not just to 
look but to look lovingly. She will insist that this 
demands 
echo of 
a renunciation, a diminution of 
the diminution of himself which 
self like an 
God supposedly 
made in the act of creation. Inevitably grace comes 
to be understood as a separate super-human faculty solely 
responsible for acts of divine charity. But as Hilary 
Ottensmeyer says, grace is not a new faculty but a new 
life, and divine charity is not a virtue apart but a 
natural one raised to a new level.9 
.. 1. M. Veto, La metaphysique religie~se de Simone Weil, 
28. 
2. M. Midgley, Beast and Man, 211-13. 
3. ibid, 258. 
4 • ibid 1 2 1 2 • 
5. ibid, 267-68. 
6. M. Friedman, To Deny our Nothingness, 138. 
7. ibid, 138. 
8. G. Frenat.td, "Simone Weil's Religious Thought in the 
Light of Catholic Theology", 367. 
9. H. Ottensmeyer, Le theme de l'amour dans l'oeuvre de 
Simone Weil , 83. 
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III Moral philosophy and spontaneity: 
the moral agent and the supernatural 
There is something a little suspect in Simone Weil's 
understanding of attention as originally divorced from 
what it is attention to, as suspended thought (as we 
have seen Simone identifies all thought which is not 
on the level of logical analysis with self -interest) 
which is transformed into waiting by the knowledge that 
the "nothingness of 
to his presence in 
twofold: I do not 
God in this world, is the bridge 
another world. My objection is 
think that this kind of unfocussed 
attention is practically possible for us, nor is it 
an ideal 
difficult 
to Simone 
at which we should be 
to trace the source of 
Weil to her belief that 
aiming. It is not 
its attractiveness 
man is essentially 
base, that with the best will in the world man by his 
own unaided efforts can do nothing to save himself. 
Any good in man is directly attributable to God: "All 
good which is absolutely pure is completely independent 
of the will. Good is transcendent. God is the good , 
PG59. 
It is worth noting that implied by this is the 
ex is ten tial ist identification of the self with the will; 
but where the existentialist finds personal autonomy 
Simone can only see slavery. Man can only receive the 
truth; "We cannot take a single step towards him. One 
doesn't walk vertically. We can only look at him. 
There is no need to search for him; all that is required 
of us is that we look in another direction. It is up 
to him to look for us , (AD215). By implication, all 
the rest is vanity. 
In the state of waiting as pictured by Simone Weil we 
are incomplete: by the process of decreation the temporal, 
corrupt part of us is perishing and what is left is 
neither good nor bad but simply neutral potential which 
can only be realised by God. We are blank paper, and 
the grace of God lies in this, that what will be written 
will be the truth. Now surely it is a mistake to believe 
(leaving asJde thP question of whether we might ever 
have been, at an earlier stage of our development, blank 
paper) that any conscious adult with a share of the 
self-knowledge which, to a greater or lesser extent, 
we allpo$sess, could work this kind of trick on himself. 
For to achieve the objectivity to which Simone Weil 
believes we should aspire we must have enough knowledge 
of our own psychology to know where to hide from our 
nature, Simone believes that we can take refuge in 
passive receptiveness, but that attitude, like any other 
we should care to adopt, represents a personal decision. 
I am not attacking the idea of the directing of a loving 
regard on the world making certain actions, in a sense, 
inevitable, while others become impossible far from 
it. But it seems to me unnecessary and disingenuous 
to maintain that we have no control over what is going 
on. Grace is mysterious but not completely so, for 
as Hilary Ottensmeyer says, we can go half way to meet 
it: the efforts of the soul count for a lot in God's 
distribution of supernatural grace. 2 
/ Georges Frenaud reminds us that "the love of God is 
always an act of our souls or rather, of our will 
reinforced by divine grace and the infused virtue of 
charity" 3 • Loving attention to what surrounds us is 
not to be achieved by coupling divine charity on to 
human indifference: firstly, because such a state of 
indifference can have no genuine correlate in experience 
and, secondly, because grace is in part at least a 
"' response to what we do. Not only does the spirit, which 
we do things matter - what matters too is that I should 
be performing a certain act rather than someone else. 
That is not to say that actions taken by themselves 
?6 
cannot be seen as important, but that this way of looking 
at things being possible and often very practical should 
not obscure the fact that public acts have a private 
history. What breaks the surface and becomes action 
may be considered more or less significant than what 
remains belpw it, depending on the criteria in use, 
but it is continuous with it. And the reverse is of 
course true: thought and action are interwoven, one 
firing the other. It is this need for continuity which 
Simone Weil fails to account for in her theory of 
attention. It does not allow us to be ourselves. 
Simone Weil was a reductionist of a kind. She believed 
that part of the soul is ~lite: "The mysteries of the 
faith are not an object for the intelligence taken as 
a faculty whose function is to affirm or deny. They 
do not rank as truths but above truth. The only part 
of the human soul which is capable of a real contact 
with them is the faculty of supernatural love, and 
consequently it is only the faculty of supernatural 
love which is capable of adhering to them" (LR60). 
It is perhaps significant, too, that Simone Weil should 
speak of God and the supernatural as "hidden and without 
form in the universe. It is good that they should be 
hidden and nameless in the soul. Otherwise there is 
a risk that what we have under the name of God is 
something imaginary (those who fed and clothed Christ 
did not know that it was Christ)... Christianity 
(Catholics and Protestants) talks too much about sacred 
things" (PG73). We have an essence, and an elusive 
one at that; that it should always be just beyond our 
grasp is a condition of its authenticity. We corrupt 
everything we touch with our rapacious imaginations 
(except beauty). Thus the only straight and true line 
that can be drawn between the faculty of supernatural 
love, hidden in some deep recess of our being, and an 
overt action is that representing obedience, because 
only an act of obedience - performed in a world "which 
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•; 
is compulsively present to the will" 
of self interest: "Obedience is the 
the only one which does not to any 
can be innocent 
only pure motive, 
extent contain a 
recompense for the action, and which leaves the father 
who is hidden to deal with the recompense." (CIIl8). 
We can identify here another point of what Iris Murdoch 
has found attractive in Simone Weil's writing; for 
Iris Murdoch says, and she is surely right, that "Will 
continually influences belief, for better or worse, 
and is ideally able to influence it through a sustained 
attention to reality." She adds: 
" This is what Simone Weil means when she says that 'will 
is obedience not resolution'. As moral agents we have 
to try to see justly, to overcome prejudice, to avoid 
temptation, to control and curb imagination, to direct 
reflection. Man is not a combination of an impersonal 
rational thinker and a personal will. He is a unified 
being who sees, and who desires in accordance with what 
he sees, and who has some continual slight control over 
the direct ion and focus of his vis ion." ( SoG4 0) 
I agree with this, but I think that Mary Midgley has 
gone much further than either Simone Weil or Iris Murdoch 
towards rounding out the character of this moral agent 
and making him less two-dimensional; for as she says 
"he cannot jump off his feet". 4 Iris Murdoch points 
out that we desire in accordance with what we see; Bernard 
Williams says much the same thing in his argument against 
utilitarianism when he draws attention to the rapport 
between what we want and what we think we can get, the 
first being a function of the second. Mary Midgley 
goes further - "an individual depends for his satisfaction 
on the repertory of tas tea native to his species", 5 and 
in doing 
debate. 
so opens out immeasurably the "good behaviour" 
In her introduction to Beast and Man she speaks 
78 
of the "tiny arid garden" 
of Brit ish Moral Philosophy; 
cultivated under 
by her writing 
the name 
she shows 
that moral philosophy does not have to be dry and boring. 
Morality involves the whole man; necessarily, because 
there is nCl other kind of man! though we may be tricked 
because of our reasoning powers into thinking there 
is, as we may be tricked into other misconceptions: 
II 
What is special about 
understanding what is 
people 
going 
is 
on, 
their power 
and using 
of 
that 
understanding to regulate it. Imagination and conceptual 
thought intensify all the conflicts by multiplying the 
options, by letting us form all manner of incompatible 
schemes and allowing us to know what we are missing, 
and also by greatly increasing our powers of 
self-deception. As against that, they can give us self-
knowledge, which is our strongest card in the attempt 
to sort conflicts out~6 
Of course this does not square with the ideal held up 
by Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil that we should arrive 
at that purified state of being which in itself dictates 
our moral choices. But this saintly spontaneity may 
not always be as immediate and pure as we would like 
to think. Mary Midgley's advice that we should know 
ourselves seems our best guard against the spiritual 
pretentiousness and self deception that Iris Murdoch 
and Simone Weil seem to be inviting. 
Simone Weil says that obedience is the fruit of attention 
by way of constraint exercised on us by God, and the 
only pure motive. If this image is at tractive it is 
at least partly because it takes the chance out of 
morality by confirming its absolute nature. The burden 
of responsibility is thus lifted from our shoulders, 
and the way to perfection opened. But if the essential 
man is a myth we need to ask ourselves if there is any 
room left still for the idea of moral perfectibility: 
for "It is perfect liberty which we should force ourselves 
to picture clearly, in the hope of attaining a liberty 
less imperfect than our present condition. For the 
better is only conceivable in relation to the perfect. 
We can only direct oursPlves towards an ideal. The 
ideal is just as unrealisable as a 
a dream it has a rapport with reality , 
dream but 
(OL85). 
unlike 
When Simone Weil says that we can only direct ourselves 
towards an ideal, she 
observation about human 
is not making an 
behaviour. She is 
empirical 
making a 
judgement about value - we should always aim at an ideal, 
indeed it is only the belief in perfect ion which throws 
any light on the path of moral progress. And I think 
there is the implication that though there are an infinite 
number of ways in which to be better, there is only 
one way of being perfect and only one perfect good: 
" The certainty that any idea which is incompatible with 
motives which are really pure is itself tainted with 
error is the first article of faith. Faith is above 
all the certainty that good is one. It is believing 
that there are several goods, distinct and mutually 
independent, such as truth, beauty, morality, which 
constitutes the sin of polytheism, not letting the 
imagination play with Apollo and Diana."(AD214) 
All this tends to undermine the value of human 
individuality for its own sake, rathe:!:' than as potential 
to be realised through the attainment of some rather 
mysterious goal. Personality is thus a means not an 
end: "Judgement is nothing more than the expression 
of what each person really is. Bad actions are only 
important because of the scars they leave on the soul ... " 
(SG85). Again it is as if some sort of sifting process 
were being carried out to separate the essential from 
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the incidental elements of existence, or at least to 
isolate that part of us that exists by right in a world 
beyond this apparent one, and to which it is called 
to return. There is much evidence in Simone Weil's 
writing of the idealism which subordinates matter to 
spirit, and it would be fair to say that she identifies 
the first with evil and the second with good: "Good 
is essentially different from evil. Evil is multiple 
and fragmentary, good is one; evil is apparent, good 
is mysterious; evil consists of actions, good of non-
action or of non-acting action ... " (CI257). By 
substituting "spirit" and "matter" for "good" and "evil" 
we do not pervert the sense. Moral perfection is 
therefore an impossibility for the created man; 
necessarily, for the "possible is the terri tory of the 
imagination and consequently of degradation" (PG228). 
Decreation and passivity alone provide the means of 
achieving supernatural love of our fellow men, for in 
the state of perfection it is as impossible for us not 
to help the person in need as it is for a stone not 
to obey the laws of gravity. "Activity" is thus banished 
from the realm of the supernatural as well as 
individuality, diversity, taste, style and it would 
seem, merit. Simone Weil offers us a ray of hope lest 
we feel that such a sacrifice is beyond us: "It is 
vi tal that we should know that love is an orientation 
and not a state of the soul " (ADl20). The ideal is 
unrealisable but we can only know God in relation to 
it. 
It se-:cms that in the writing of Simone Weil the idea 
of perfection is inextricably mixed up with a theology 
which celebrates death death of the self through 
suffering which is acknowledged and borne without false 
consolation, death on the Cross made all the more noble 
by there being no hope of resurrection. The end of 
all moral striving, the attainment of moral perfection, 
is in union with God through sharing absolutely in his 
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impotence and hopelessness. Simone Weil's formulation 
of the problem of suffering appears to have a kind of 
honesty in that she does nothing to defend herself from 
the full horror of human affliction: she says that 
beauty 
(other 
is contemplating what cannot be contemplated 
people's affliction) without fleeing (CS16). 
She not only does not flee from affliction but seems 
positively to embrace it, or at least to contemplate 
it with a fixedness which could in itself be considered 
unnatural. Although her experience of affliction may 
have been genuine the conclusion she draws from it is 
based on falsehood: important distinctions are blurred 
including that between good and evil. As Susan Taubes 
says: "her mystical atheism offers a religion to the 
afflicted only at the price of blindfolding one's self 
to the fact of those who profit from their affliction 
and consequently serving their ends."7 
Iris Murdoch finds Simone Weil inspiring, which, because 
of the force of her writing and her evident sincerity, 
she certainly is. But she uses her very selectively. 
She approves of her theory of attention in so far as 
it expresses "the idea of a just and loving gaze directed 
upon an individual reality~~'*~Like Simone Weil she 
believes that this is what moral activity should ideally 
be, and that nothing more is required of us than that 
we should perfect this technique - far from easy. But 
there the resemblance between the two ends, with Iris 
Murdoch's version of the argument foundering on the 
chimerical quality of her conception of the Good, while 
Simone Weil commits the double error of thinking that 
our personalities can be put aside as if they did not 
belong to us in the fullest sense, and that this would 
allow us better to pay attention. Iris Murdoch does 
not fall into this trap; she is pessimistic about human 
nature but not to the point where she despairs of it 
altogether. More importantly, she believes that being 
good is a form of self- expression (see pageH1 ). 
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PART FOUR 
I Human and transcendant value 
Simone Weil believes that we each have our own moral 
level: "We should only perform those acts of goodness 
which we cannot stop ourselves from doing, those which 
we cannot not do; but we should all the time be 
increasing by means of well-directed attention the number 
of acts we cannot not do " ( PG5 7 ). "We should not take 
one step, even in the direction of good, further than 
we are irresistibly pushed by God... But we should 
be ready to let him push us anywhere, right to the limit 
(the cross ... ) " ( PG58), 
Thus understood goodness is like blinking 
action. It ought to be beyond our control; 
a reflex 
this is 
its guarantee of purity. Nothing could be further from 
Mary Midgley's characterisation of moral activity as 
resolving conflicts through the exercise of conscience 
(conscience being understood as "the man himself in 
his capacity as decider")l in which control is of the 
essence; each act we perform is stamped with the mark 
of 
to 
our personality. 
us in the sense 
Though public, 
that they are 
our acts belong 
an expression of 
ourselves: "How like him to do that", we 
Consistency, especially when displayed in 
treat people of differing status and react in 
~ircumstances, is more often the mark of 
than 
is 
a bad man. 
being the same 
Having a well-integrated 
all the way through; 
(though this knowledge 
often say. 
the way we 
very varying 
a good man 
personality 
it 
need 
implies 
knowledge of self 
in the forefront of our minds), a well defined 
not 
set 
be 
of 
priorities and a proper sense of personal worth. 
Well-integrated 
pushed. Their 
people do not wait to 
own refexions on moral 
be irresistibly 
problems should 
provide a sufficient spur to action. Simone Weil on 
the other hand would depersonalise good completely 
in the interest of what Susan Taubes calls her obsession 
with purity. But in so doing I believe she demonstrates 
not only a streak of perversity but also a blunted 
appreciation. of the fact that if human life matters 
at all, it matters first and foremost for its own sake. 
It is an end in itself and the crucial nature of moral 
decisions derives exclusively from this. Morality is 
not the icing on the cake but, quite literally, a matter 
of life and death. By her theory of passive action 
Simone Weil sets herself at a remove from the world: 
the resulting emptiness she believes is an opening for 
the supernatural action of grace: "Not to use all the 
power which one has in one's possession is to endure 
emptiness. This is contrary to all the laws of nature; 
it can be achieved only by grace." The personality 
abhors a vacuum, says Simone Weil - this is why we are 
constitutionally unable to know ourselves as we really 
are. Blows to our pride, which we should be disciplined 
and humble enough to admit as simply revealing our true 
level, are parried by fantasy rushing in to fill the 
void: " ... anything which diminishes or destroys our 
social prestige, our right to consideration, seems to 
alter or destroy our very essence, such is the extent 
to which we replace substance with illusion " (PCAD109). 
While this mechanism of self-compensation operates there 
can be no room for grace, and any apparently charitable 
act which we perform when untouched by grace will 
necessarily be tainted by impure motives such as the 
desire for gratitude, or social approbation, or the 
need to boost our own egos - or very likely all of these. 
of the politics of power 
that we naturally hate 
Simone Weil was very conscious 
and domination: she believed 
the afflicted and tend to turn on them as hens turn 
on one of their number who is injured, though Victor 
Gollancz, more of an optimist about human nature, 
challenged not only this but her whole theory of gravity. 
Her argument was that natural human charity necessarily 
carried with it a degree of humiliation for its object. 
Thus she remarks that "It is not surprising that a man 
who has some bread should give a p ieee of it to someone 
who is starving. What is surprising is that he should 
be able to qo this in a way different from that in which 
one buys an object. Charity when it is not supernatural 
is similar to the making of a purchase. The afflicted 
person i s bought " ( AD 13 3 ) . 
Simone Weil 
respond to 
is 
believed that 
the afflicted, 
invest them 
the only way one is able to 
not as objects but as real 
with one's own selfhood at people, 
the cost 
to 
of one's own destruction and in so doing 
imitate God's act of creation and redemption. Instead 
of affirming our own existence and righteousness 
through an act of charity, we should be sacrificing 
those very things through an act of renunciation, that 
is, reducing ourselves to a state of voluntary impotence 
as God has done before us. But as Susan Taubes says: 
"The alternative to domination is not impotence but 
the elimination of domination. Impotence is only one 
side of the power relation and presupposes the relation 
of man's domination over man." 2 The surrender of power 
by an individual merely places that power in somebody 
else's possession; it is an act of self-affirmation 
disguised under another name, whereas supernatural charity 
is an act of self-denial: "The person who does good 
in Christ's name when in the presence of someone in 
distress feels no distance between that person and 
himself; he transfers all his being into the other person; 
from that point the act of giving food is as instinctive 
and immediate as the act of eating when we ourselves 
are hungry" (PCADll7). 
Is this kind of spontaneity the mark of a good action? 
In order to answer such a question we should try to 
isolate Simone Weil's moral psychology from its sometimes 
•• 
rather bizarre theological context; I think this is 
what Iris Murdoch has done with the idea of attention 
for which she acknowledges her debt to Simone Weil. 
Iris Murdoch is in sympathy with Simone Weil's thought 
when understood in its "soft", as opposed to its intended, 
sense. Her. conclusion that the only genuine way to 
be good is to be good "for nothing" is not so very far 
from Simone's experience of renunciation and emptiness. 
Like Simone she glimpses a reality beyond that which 
is immediately present to the senses: 
"If a scientifically- minded empiricism 
is not to swallow up the study of 
ethics completely, philosophers must 
try to invent a terminology which 
shows how our natural psychology can 
be altered by conceptions which lie 
beyond its rang~. It seems to me 
that the platonic metaphor of the 
idea of" the Good provides a sui table 
picture here. 
of course 
conception of 
which almost 
With this picture must 
be joined a realistic 
natural psychology (about 
all philosophers seem 
to me to have "been too optimistic) 
and also 
lack of 
good has 
indeed it 
an acceptance of the utter 
finality in human life. The 
nothing to do with purpose, 
excludes the idea of purpose. 
vanity' is the beginning and 
of ethics. The only genuine 
way to be good is to be good 'for 
'All is 
the end 
nothing' in the midst of a scene where 
every 'natural' thing, including one's 
own mind, is subject to chance, that 
is, to necessity. That 'for nothing' 
is indeed the experienced correlate 
of the invisibility or non-representable 
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blankness of the idea of Good itself." 
(SoG7l) 
Iris Murdoch rightly dismisses utilitarian theories 
of ethics as crude when is the payoff to come and 
can the eng always justify the means? She wants to 
banish ends from discussions of morality. Like Simone 
Weil she rejects any suggestion 
prejudicial to the accomplishment 
of compensation, as 
of a right action. 
Thus such actions become inspired leaps in the dark, 
though not from the dark; Iris Murdoch believes in 
a substantial soul whose constant patient ground-work 
of loving attention to reality should ideally have made 
the action taken inevitable. It is the absence of 
security, in the form of knowledge that what we are 
doing will be personally rewarding, that guarantees 
the reality of our love. Both Simone Weil and Iris 
Murdoch think that unselfish acts are personally rewarding 
in that they are openings for grace, but this is not 
a reward - it works on our vision and not on our good 
conceit of ourselves. This is 
of morals, I think because it 
oneself for an ideal - the good. 
Where do we look for the good? 
a rather inspiring view 
allows one to sacrifice 
We must remember that 
Simone Weil visualised a point at which all goods in 
their highest form converge; this point is the person 
of God. To this extent Elizabeth Anscombe and she are 
in agreement, and together they challenge Iris Murdoch's 
view that good can be at once transcendent and impersonal. 
The view that the good is one she believes to be 
necessarily theistic, for were there no God there would 
be no justification for not maintaining the distinction 
between the virtues: "To know the divinity only as 
power and not as good is idolatry, and if this is the 
state of things it rna t ters little whether there is one 
or several. It is only because Good is one that we 
should recognise .one God " ( PCAD4 8) . (She at tacks the 
God of Isrr>Pl as a God of power, a projection of the 
social ambition of a certain race of people.) The good 
is like a seamless web of reality displaying "the unity 
and interdependence of the moral world 11 ; 3 indeed, the 
moral world and reality are one and the same. It is 
modern science that is responsible for the fallacy that 
truth is neutral. 
be so: 
Richard Rees argues that it cannot 
" 
... the spirit of truth is the energy 
of truth, it is truth as an active 
force. And this active force is pure 
love. It is therefore impossible 
that a science which claims to be 
beyond good and evil and to pursue 
truth for truth's sake and fact for 
fact's sake should be inspired by 
the spirit of truth. For it to be 
so inspired, the scientist would need 
to have a conception of the object 
of his studies which contained something 
he could love, that is to say, some 
aspect of the good. But in facts, 
in force, in matter, when considered 
in isolation, in themselves, without 
reference to anything else, there 
is nothing that a human mind can love~4 
The concepts of value and love, and the supremacy of 
the latter, cannot be contained by science, so the 
argument goes, but bear witness to the existence of 
another world, the reality of which is only knowable 
through love. This is the world of things as they really 
are, of which the world of things as they seem is a 
distorted image. We do not create this world of reality 
out of our own love. It is not "some imaginary concoction 
out of our idea of our own character but ... sorne thing 
so external and so remote that we can only now and then 
get a distant hint of it".5 It is knowledge which must 
be striven for. There is much support for 
phllosophical view in Simone Weil's work: 
"Love of 
expression. 
of love. 
we love 
which we 
the truth is an improper 
The truth is not an object 
It is not an object. 1:/ha t 
is something which exists, 
believe and which can 
consequently be an occasion for truth 
or error. A truth is always the truth 
of something. The truth is the glow 
of reality. The object of love is 
not truth but reality. To desire 
the truth is to desire direct contact 
with reality. To desire direct contact 
with something real is to love it. 
We only want to know the truth so 
that we can love truly. We want to 
know the truth about what we love. 
Instead of talking about love of the 
truth we would do better to talk about 
a spirit of truth in love."(E215) 
this 
Simone believed that this love is supernatural and that 
we can only receive it, that our sole obligation is 
to hold ourselves in an attitude of receptivity. "We 
must detach our desire from everything which is good 
and wait. Experience proves that this wait is rewarded. 
It is thus that we touch the absolute good" (PG18). 
What we have immediate knowledge of is not the real 
world but a distorted version of that world; both Simone 
Weil and Iris Murdoch cast the self in the role of 
determined egotist, and see it as the main, indeed the 
only, obstacle to realism: "The chief enemy of excellence 
in morality (and also in art) is personal fantasy: the 
tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and 
dreams which prevents one from seeing what is outside 
90 
one'~oCS~Simone's view was more extreme; she did not 
believe this kind of escapism to be merely a common 
human failing, but the very mark of created man, his 
essential characteristic. 
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II Spirituality and value 
The distinction between imagination and fantasy is 
important here. Iris Murdoch believes fantasy is wholly 
bad because it is always egotistical and has no regard 
for truth. On the other hand imagination, being the 
faculty of sympathy, the ability to put ourselves in 
other peoples shoes, is good. Good literature is 
imaginative, bad literature and I think Iris Murdoch 
(who is particularly critical of the medium) would add, 
many television programmes are fantastic; good 
literature deals with what is external and independent, 
bad literature with projections of the self disguised 
as objective reality. 
where, incidentally, 
In her 
she follows 
judgement of fantasy, 
and may 
have been influenced by her, I 
Simone Weil 
think Iris Murdoch is 
the distinction between 
by no means complete and 
those people with the most 
also those with the readiest 
too harsh, and over simple: 
imagination and fantasy is 
it may even be true that 
active fantasy lives are 
sympathy for the plight of others. It would be very 
d iff icul t to demonstrate sat isfac tori ly any such thing, 
but it is surely true that highly imaginative people 
will be prone to fantasising, at least through some 
period of their lives. I do not think fantasy can be 
judged good or bad in itself, but only in relation to 
the part it plays in life. Walter Mitty and Billy Liar 
are not merely comic and tragic but highly grotesque, 
and to suggest that sane people, i.e. the great majority 
of us, are compulsive fantasisers who manage to keep 
the habit secret for the sake of respectability, and 
would have retreated long ago into a dream world if 
it were not for the fact that we keep barking our shins 
on hard objects thrown up by chance and necessity, is 
equally absurd. Children are positively encouraged 
to be 
best 
imaginative 
children's 
and to fantasise, and 
literature (by 'best' 
in much of the 
I mean most 
enjoyable) the distinguishing line between the imaginative 
and the fantastic is hard to draw. And the eight-year-
old devouring school stories of absolutely no literary 
be. 
merit may ten years la tert.. reading Henry James with the 
same enthusiasm, not in spite of but because of that 
early flirtatjnn wtth the rubbishy. All writers of 
fiction are after all in the same business, and to call 
Jane Austen sublime and Barbara Cartland ridiculous 
is to miss 
or going to 
not in the 
that easily 
the point that the enjoyment of reading, 
the cinema or watching television, lies 
opportunity to escape horrid reality not 
escaped but in the satisfaction of the 
urge to hear about other people and other worlds. We 
do not love stories about other people only because 
we want to forget our own. Of course there is rubbish 
and rubbish: libertarian arguments which defend 
pornographic video films on the grounds that what we 
do within our own four walls concerns no one but ourselves 
are, quite simply, totally incorrect. A's twisted 
pleasure can only be obtained at B's expense, and victims 
have rights too. 
It is however true that Jane Austen and Barbara Cartland 
make different demands on their readers. Our response 
to literature is largely one of recognition - "oft thought 
but ne'er so well expressed"- and there is something 
very pleasant about the familiar, probably because of 
its power to assure us that the privacy of our thoughts 
is physical rather than logical, and that our personal 
experience is held in the common currency of human 
experience. Thus our appreciation of literature is 
a function of the way our minds have been furnished, 
and what strikes a chord with some will be lost on others. 
Good literature does more than tell us what we already 
know, it presents this knowledge in a particularly 
striking way so as to deepen our understanding of concepts 
over which we already have some hold. Iris Murdoch 
writes: 
HArt is a special discerning exercise 
of intelligence in relation to the 
real; 
has 
and 
and although aesthetic form 
essential elements of trickery 
magic, yet form in art, as form 
in philosophy, is designed to 
communicate and re\real. 
to 
is 
In 
good 
a 
of joy in response 
essential ingredient 
the revelation of reality, 
world as really real ... the 
never able 
before." l 
so clearly to 
the shock 
art, an 
sense of 
of the 
we were 
see it 
So the appreciation of good literature can make us more 
adequate moral agents by helping to develop the inner 
resources on which good moral judgement depends. As 
Josef Pieper expresses it, "the greater the power of 
establishing relations the greater the degree of 
inwardness... The more embracing the power with which 
to relate oneself to objective being, the rr.,_ re deeply 
that power needs to be anchored in the inner self of 
the subject so as to counter-balance the step it takes 
outside." 2 
Enjoying good books and paintings increases the degree 
of inwardness, or to put it more philosophically, 
substantiality of the self. But "good" is the operative 
word here, and art is only as good as it is true: as 
Iris Murdoch points out, "Most derogatory critical 
terms impute some kind of falsehood" 3 for example 
" fake " , " s e l f,i n d u l gent " , "pre tent i o us " , 
"meretricious" etc. and fantasy may be 
but it is certainly self-indulgent. The 
"sentimental", 
all of these 
value of art 
lies in its perception of the world as it really is, 
not as we would 
suspicion of art 
like it to be. 
which is merely 
She shares Plato's 
a projection of our 
wishes, "where the veiled something which is sought 
and found is no more than a shadow out of the private 
stoce-room of the personal subconscious."4 
Iris Murdoch's chief demand of art and mocal philosophy 
is the samei that they should offer a convincing picture 
of the human personality. This she believes the modern 
"crystalline" novel fails to do because in stripping 
away the social and moral packaging of man which so 
preoccupied the great nineteenth century novelists she 
much admires, 
misrepresented 
twentieth 
him and 
century writers 
told a lie about 
of fiction have 
life. Dorothy 
Emmet, arguing against a completely autonomous ethical 
system, makes this same point that we are best to be 
understood 
space, but 
as 
as 
having not only a location in 
extended and contiguous beings: 
+- • vlme and 
"Facts 
can be relevant because they are seen in relation to 
people's purposes, needs, interests, happiness, ideals. 
Ethics may find its place in this value-laden context 
of human interests and purposes, especially as these 
are pursued in social relationships with other people. "5 
And she points out that we "are too much members one 
of another to be able to detect just where other people's 
influence ends and our own efforts begin. "6 Like Mary 
Midgley, Dorothy Emmet appreciates the importance of 
human drives, whereas Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch picture 
personality as essentially contemplative, and so fail 
to make sufficient allowance for the dynamism which 
is a strong feature of mental health. In her own writing 
Iris Murdoch tries to show how great is the part of 
the contingent in our lives and how superficial our 
understanding of our own and other people's motives. 
I should think it is her sense of the mystery of existence 
which attracts her to the Christian mythology "as a 
mode of understanding", but she cannot believe in an 
omnipotent God; for her "The image of a morally perfect 
but not all-powerful Goodness seems ... better to express 
some ultimate (inexpressible) truth about our condition".7 
Simone Weil might well 
Murdoch been prepared 
God, for Simone Weil's 
have agreed with her had Iris 
to identify this Goodness with 
theodicy demands that God, through 
the act of creation, give up his omnipotence, though 
not his absolute goodness. 
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III Vo.lues a,nd mol"'al pro9re.ss 
Iris r~Iurdoch maintains that the contemplation of beauty 
does us go?d by clearing our minds of selfish care, 
and that with our consciousness thus purified we are 
better placed, when the moment of choice comes, to choose 
the good. Indeed, she is almost providing us with a 
definition of the good that to which the "unselfed" 
being is attracted: "The defeat of illusion requires 
moral effort. The instructed and morally purified mind 
sees reality clearly and indeed (in an important sense) 
provides us with the concept".l One is inclined to 
think: If only 't-l c· were that simple, if only I could 
reach a state of being which guaranteed the goodness 
of my actions. And it does seem very likely that 
saintliness is something like this, but surely the need 
for guidelines remains an urgent one for ordinary mortals, 
and I think it less vague and more helpful in some 
contexts to talk about impartiality rather than 
unselfisness. So Dorothy Emmet says, " we must be 
able to pass judgement on our own conduct as we would 
on that of another person and vice versa". 2 This does 
not mean to say that our detachment requires that we 
be desensitised, for "Sympathy can go along with 
the capacity to put oneself imaginatively into the role 
of the impartial spectator. It means not the same as 
approval, but the capacity to feel pass ions and motives 
while at the same time looking at them with the detachment 
proper to this new role." 3 Dorothy Emmet makes these 
recommendations in the context of a discussion on the 
theory of an Ideal Observer, whom she says "might judge 
better if he were sympathetic, angry, or even excited, 
since these emotions might arouse and sustain his concern. 
But never the less, I think we should hold that he should 
have 'freedom of spirit' in being able to detach these 
emotions from his personal preferences and interests".4 
This detachment should further the cause of consistency 
in our moral judgements. Of course we can be consistent 
and mistaken, nor is it any excuse for our own poor 
conduct that we would accept such behaviour in other 
people. To. the formal criterion of consistency Dorothy 
Emmet adds the non-formal factor of relevance. If the 
universalizability principle is to be properly applied 
we must be able to defend the relevance of reasons given 
for making a distinct ion be tween one case and another, 
for the purpose of treating the two cases d if feren t ly. 
Thus defined, universal iza bi l i ty, though clearly not 
a sufficient condition of just action, provides necessary 
stiffening to the ideal held up by Iris Murdoch of 
instinctive goodness. Appealing though this ideal is, 
the need lingers on for some checking procedure which 
allows us to frame such questions as, "How do I know 
that I have done right?" Iris Murdoch stresses the 
importance of aiming at goodness rather than right action 
- pointing out that to copy a right action is not always 
enough, that the possibility of letting oneself down 
is always there. Invoking the Ideal Observer seems 
an obvious move to make when trying to account for the 
distorting effect that personal involvement may have 
on the way we view a situation. As Dorothy Emmet points, 
" an Ideal Observer who knew all the facts and the 
consequences of all possible alternatives and was 
completely impartial could only be God".5 And it is 
hard when discussing morality to forget that the eye 
of God may be upon us, and that moral decisions are 
the kind of decisions on which it is important that 
there should be a measure of consensus, i.e. "what 
God thinks". Dorothy Emmet quotes Firth as saying that 
the Ideal Observer need not exist, the only requirement 
being that we should be able to say how such a one would 
have reacted.6 
If this consensus is to be achieved we must be able 
to give reasons for our moral views and actions; and 
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we should want to convert other people to our point 
of view. Moral relativism, understood as the belief 
that all moral stances, being context dependent, are 
immune from the criticism which could only be fuelled 
by measurement against standards deemed absolute, is 
not ~ompRt.iqle with the truth that some moral judgements 
are better than others. And insofar as Iris Murdoch 
is saying that moral judgement is an area in which we 
can make progress she is surely correct. Our moral 
judgement like all skills can be improved with practice, 
especially through being used in difficult situations 
which require us to expand our set of moral concepts. 
However, no degree of selflessness will guarantee that 
when the moment of choice comes our instinctive reaction 
(and Iris Murdoch believes that moral decisions are 
ideally immediate) will embody a moral judgement which 
could not be improved upon by reference to any publicly 
principle of identifiable criteria such as the 
universalizability or disinterestedness in the formal 
guise of the Ideal Observer. 
At this point it might by helpful to quote the example 
taken from The Sovereignty of Good to which I referred 
earlier (see. p~c. .52.): 
u A mother, whom I shall call M, feels hostility 
to her daughter-indaw, whom I shall call D. 
M finds D quite a goodhearted girl, but while 
not exactly common yet certainly unpolished 
and lacking in dignity and refinement 
M feels that her son has married beneath him 
However, the M of the example is an 
intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable 
of self-criticism, capable of giving careful 
and just attention to an object which confronts 
her. M tells herself: 'I am old-fashioned 
and conventional. 
narrowminded. I 
I may be prejudiced and 
may be snobbish. I am 
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certainly jealous. Let me look again.' Here 
I assume that M observes D or at least reflects 
deliberately about D, until gradually her 
vision of D alters. If we take D to be now 
absent or dead this can make it clear that 
the ch~nge is not in D's behaviour but in 
l\'1' s mind. D is discovered to be not vulgar 
but refreshingly simple, not undignified but 
spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely 
juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so 
on." (SoG 17) 
Iris Murdoch's idea is that when M looks at D with love, 
she sees her as she really is, where before she had 
only seen a false image of D. This idea of self as 
a barrier obscuring reality is present throughout Simone 
Weil's work, as when she asks that the "veil of unreality 
be drawn back so that we may see what is thus given 
to us" ( PG 3 0 ). So far so good - we can all understand 
what M is doing and approve of it. Yet while Iris Murdoch 
and Simone Weil stress the "selfless" side of M's activity 
the focussing of "purified" attention on D there 
is another way of looking at the situation. l\'1 is putting 
her own house in order and she is able to do this because 
she knows what a well-ordered human personality is like 
and where she is falling short. This self-knowledge 
is an essential prerequisite of her being able, and 
willing, to sort out her attitude to D. Mary Midgley's 
idea (and in this she admits to following Bishop Butler) 
is that our moral 
own nature. She 
sense is tuned to the balance of 
has argued most effectively that 
our 
we 
do have innate tendencies, and that it is characteristic 
of these tendencies that each one should have what Bishop 
Butler calls its "natural stint and bound"; that is 
to say, there is a balance. If we accept this it becomes 
obvious that some sort of standard of behaviour is 
emerging which is closely related to this natural balance: 
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" Thus the notion of every passion having its 
stint and bound, which is well borne out by 
the behaviour of other species, makes sense 
of the paradox of nature and allows us a clear 
understanding of evil. What is evil must 
in a ~ay be part of our nature, since what 
stands right outside it could be no temptation 
to us, would even be beyond our power. It 
has to be something possible for us, something 
for which we are equipped and to which we 
are drawn but outrageous, damaging to the 
proper arrangement of the whole. If it 
prevails, it does so at a monstrous price, 
destroying what is more central. And perhaps 
the de 1 i berate policy that it should prevail 
is what we mean by evil itself~ 
It follows that what is good must also be part of our 
nature since were it alien to that nature it would hold 
no attraction for us. It follows too that goodness 
is possible for us, indeed possible because we have 
a nature, and not in spite of that nature, as Simone 
Weil would have us believe. On the level of experience 
this rings true; it is difficult to reconcile goodness 
and inadequacy when they are present in the same person. 
Simone Weil's concern for the suffering was real and 
admirable but its value is somehow compromised, I feel, 
by evidence of the self-destructive cycle of deep unease 
and sacrifice in which she was caught up. Virtue should 
make us fulfilled, not set us at odds with ourse 1 ves. 
In such a conte~t personal growth and self-fulfilment 
are not to be seen as peripheral aims, but as at the 
very heart of the matter. 
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It is part of the mystique of the Good as understood 
by Iris Murdoch that we should never have a ladder quite 
long enough to reach it: 
"Good is the focus of attention when an intent 
to be virtuous co-exists (as perhaps it almost 
always 
Here, 
as the 
Good. 
While 
as a 
cannot 
does) with some unclarity of vision. 
as I have said earlier, beauty appears 
visible and accessible aspect of the 
The Good itself is not visible 
it seems 
centre or 
quite be 
proper to 
focus of 
thought 
represent 
attention, 
of as a 
the Good 
yet it 
'visible' 
one in that it cannot be experienced or 
represented or defined.« (SoG 70) 
The same thought is in Simone Weil's mind when she writes 
that "A good action is accomplished while keeping the 
attention and intention totally orientated towards the 
good, pure and impossible, without disguising with any 
lie the attract ion or the impossibility of pure good " 
(PG 129). The good is external, elusive, inspirational 
and above all mysterious, for its origin is not clear 
to us, only its absolute authority. If we are unselfish 
and look out at the world with an open, loving regard 
we will be rewarded with knowledge of reality; the 
alternative is that we remain in the prison of the self, 
in a very real and terrifying sense. "We must make 
a new effort at each step and if we cease to make an 
effort before we have got out, even if we are almost 
there, we will never get out. The last steps are the 
hardest" (SG 93). 
As Iris Murdoch rightly says, 
individual is never complete 
has an endless task" (SoG 28). 
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our knowledge of the 
"M confronted with D 
But to situate goodness 
at the nevenko-be-attained limit of this knowledge is 
surely to tantalise us to no useful end. Goodness is 
to be found, if it is to be found at all, as a movable 
point around which our attempts to solve conflicts such 
as the one M is facing may turn. 
points out tpat when 
Mary Midgley rightly 
''we wonder whether, or why, or how far something 
is good, we are not connecting it externally 
with an abstract property called goodness. 
We are not asking for evidence of its goodness 
in the sense of an extra fact, as we might 
cite a man's being seen with a bloody knife 
as evidence for his having committed a murder. 
We are asking for specification, the point 
of which will be to connect it with a particular 
want ."1 
There must always be an answer to the question, "In 
what way is this particular thing good?", and that answer 
is likely to be an enlargement on the way in which that 
thing meets a human need. Someone might object to this 
on the grounds that allowance is not made for the 
inspirational quality of the concept of goodness, its 
being something at which we can aim. However, ceasing 
to believe in goodness as an external property need 
not lead us to embrace a wishy-washy moral relativism, 
because the moral law is not being jettisoned, simply 
given its proper place as complementary to our human 
nature. Self-knowledge is our key to understanding 
this nature, and the central importance of love to 
morality is found to be the reflection of the crucial 
character of our human need to give and receive affection. 
For Iris Murdoch, beauty has no moral message. If it 
is connected with goodness it is not as an educational 
tool for purifying the soul which is Simone Weil' s 
idea but as a feature of the world which good souls 
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inhabit. Good art is different because it has a message 
and literature is the ultimate message-carrying art 
form: 
11 Words are the most subtle symbols which we 
pouess and 
The living 
our human fabric depends 
and radical nature of 
on them. 
language 
is something which we forget at our peril. 
It is totally misleading to speak, for instance 
of 'two cultures', one literary-humane and 
the other scientific, as if these were of 
equal status. There is only one culture, 
of which science, so interesting and so 
dangerous, is now an important part. But 
the most essential and fundamental aspect 
of culture is the study of literature, since 
this is an education in how to picture and 
understand human situations. We are men and 
we are moral agents before we are scientists, 
and the place of science in human life must 
be discussed in words.u (SoG 34) 
The purpose of good art is to tell the truth, not by 
mirroring real life, which 
graphic art and unreadable 
would produce uninteresting 
books, but by interpreting 
it. Not even bad art is purely representational; indeed, 
it is likely to carry the most strident and 
highly-coloured messages in the whole field of creativity. 
Of course we are all like artists in that we are 
constantly interpreting and evaluating; the distinction 
beLween facts and the interpretation we put on them 
is a false one because experience does not exist in 
a raw, natural state, waiting to be shaped into coherence. 
The state of mind of pure receptivity is a myth for 
there can be no distinction between knowing a fact and 
making something of it. This is the case even with 
those supposedly most objective facts, scientific 
ones. For Iris Murdoch, the distinction between fact 
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and value is by no means a clear one, and the distinction 
which she would rather talk about is that between 
appearance and reality. For one thing it is the starting 
point for philosophical enquiry; for example, the stick 
which is straight appears to be bent because of the 
effect of r-efraction. In this case the brirlgP between 
appearance and reality is knowledge, and Iris Murdoch 
believes that, likewise, the gap between what is apparent 
and what is good can be bridged by knowledge of value 
concepts. That is, we need not simply knowledge of 
the conventions governing the meaningful use of a certain 
word, but knowledge gained through acquantance with 
the experience of that concept, and acquaintance which 
will probably be first hand but filled out to a greater 
or lesser extent by the experience, real or imagined, 
of others. First hand experience of a value concept 
is likely to come through relationships with other people. 
Iris Murdoch says that "the practice of personal relations 
is the fundamental school of virtue. The spiritual 
revelations involved in dealing with people are in an 
evident sense more important than those available through 
art, though they tend to be less clear. 112 It is one 
of the functions of literature to provide us with these 
revelations in an easily digestible form, allowing us 
to transcend our own, necessarily very limited, experience 
and make more rapid progress towards moral maturity 
than we could have done otherwise. However, the very 
ease with which messages in literature can be assimilated 
poses a threat to truth. The writer is tempted to be 
glib and use his God-like authority over his characters 
to resolve problems which have no solution, or make 
sense out of what is really senseless, for instance, 
to offer hope and consolation where there is none. 
Iris Murdoch follows Simone Weil in despising consolation 
in art as the latter despises 
for cosiness, the belief that 
us nowhere, certainly not out 
light of the sun. 
101 
consolation in religion, 
all will be well, leads 
of the cave and in to the 
1. M. Midgley, Beast and Man, 80. 
2. I. Murdoch, The Fire and the Sun, 77. 
PART FIVE 
I v G.I!Aes and moroJ dile..mme\5 
lt\ c.orr"'ec..tion of Simone We.i I 
IH this point T shn11l rl like to think again about the 
''something else" which characterises a moral dilemma 
and which a "non-naturalistic" view of ethics cannot 
encompass. In her article "Is 'Moral' a Dirty Word?"l 
Mary Midgley refers 
the distinguishing 
to Philippa Foot's suggestion that 
marks of the moral are: ( l ) a 
particular content, namely human good and harm, and 
(2) seriousness. Obviously (2) derives from (1), in 
a that human good and harm is 
this seriousness is rooted in 
not in an individual's decision 
serious 
the way 
to take 
business, 
things are 
human good 
and 
and 
and 
harm seriously. For we do not actually believe that 
those who do not value human well-being are in this 
position because of a moral choice which they have made. 
We think, rather, that something very vital in their 
make-up is lacking, as in the case of the psychopath. 
It cannot simply be the case that a man's moral principles 
are nothing more nor less than those universal principles 
he acts on, for as Philippa Foot pointed 
"not-tread ing-on-thElfl ines-of-the-pa ving-s tones 
out, 
would 
not be a moral principle even if someone always did 
it and expected other people to do it". That special 
content, that something else which characterises the 
moral, is missing. The formal requirements of 
universalisability and consistency can and should be 
met by a moral principle, but it is not by these marks 
that we recognise it as such. 
Contrary to Simone Weil' s idea, our sociability is an 
all-important feature of our moral landscape, because 
the fact of our being social beings has a direct bearing 
on our human needs and desires. Though we may be trained 
to be existentialists at a conscious level we should 
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not let this circumstance trick us into denying the 
forces that have shaped and move us, for we should ensure 
th2.t we all exist as human beings only in so far as 
we acknowledge our interdependence. Of course we are 
all individuals and this individualism is to be highly 
valued, so to meet someone with a truly original point 
of view is refreshing and can be a delight. And when 
Iris Murdoch writes, "I also feel ln the long run that 
one must be good in a way peculiar to oneself, that 
one must be in some sense characteristic in one's 
goodness, so that that whole area of life is concerned 
with understanding one's own personality and building 
a sort of picture of oneself ", 2 she is surely right 
to link virtue with personal fulfilment, and both these 
things with 
Simone Weil. 
self-knowledge, in complete contrast to 
We exercise our individuality within certain 
limits 
to an 
which constrain 
original point 
us all, 
of view, 
otherwise 
or indeed 
our reaction 
any point of 
view other than our own, would be blank non-comprehension. 
In fact, this is very seldom the case and when it is 
we are puzzled, certainly, and frequently disturbed 
when we fail to communicate. It may be one mark of 
good writing that it deals with a universal theme as 
well as the particular topic, so that we say of a serious 
nove 1 that it is about, let us suppose, the adventures 
of a group of schoolboys who find themselves alone and 
autonomous on an otherwise 
the anarchic, destructive 
can easily assimilate what 
it is to be found in the 
deserted 
side of 
island, and 
human nature. 
about 
We 
is new and unfamiliar when 
world of particular things 
where choice, variety and novelty are considered to 
be virtues, but the world of feeling is small and 
necessarily circumscribed, and from an early age we 
know our way around it, are rarely if ever taken 
completely by surprise there, and, above all, need to 
feel that we are not alone there and that our emotions 
conform to a familiar human pattern. The themes of 
serious art are relatively few because we are so 
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homogeneous. The analysis and classification of human 
behaviour is such a popular activity because: (i) we 
are all pretty well-qualified to do it, and (ii) we 
have a strong personal interest in bringing the seemingly 
most bizarre and idiosyncratic conduct within the limits 
of our understanding. 
Though there remains the chicken and egg question of 
whether we are alike because we are sociable or sociable 
because we are alike, that we all inhabit a common world 
is a circumstance which goes a long way towards explaining 
both our sociability and our similar emotional make-
up, especially when we remember that our own bodies 
and other peoples' are a part of this common world. 
It is not through ch::mce that we have the nature that 
we do but through needing to relate to the world and, 
by implication, to our fellow human beings. In her 
article, !!Towards a New Understanding of Human Nature: 
The Limits of Individualism" Mary Midgley criticizes 
individualist ethics for failing to take account of 
the dependence of human beings on their background, 
for once this is appreciated"... it must emerge that 
a whole set of communal aspects of life, which used 
to be despised and attributed to the corrupting influence 
of religion, now appear to be necessary and understandable 
in terms of the s c i en c e s . They are not just instruments 
of political oppression but essential conditions of 
life." 3 
An obvious example would be family life and the special 
ties that this institution cr~ates. The individualist 
(who is characterised by the attributes of stoicism 
and self-sufficiency), and Simone Weil is one, is free 
to slough off his role as a family member, provided 
only that he is prepared to bear life's burden alone. 
As Iris Murdoch notes, this character is beloved by 
novelists as much as by moral philosophers ( SoG 8 0) . 
There is a disproportionately high number of orphans 
11Z. 
and one-parerlt families in children's stories because 
authors are freer to make exciting things happen to 
their heroes and heroines once they have been removed 
from the constraints imposed by a normal family 1 ife. 
This is quite acceptable and makes for enjoyable fantasy 
so long as the conventions of the genre demand a happy 
ending, and because, 
real horror, as in 
even when things are at their worst, 
a vintage 
isolated 
1930s 
adults 
detective story, 
the picture is is kept at bay. For 
less hopeful, for though the loner, almost always male, 
is seen especially by film-makers in recent years as 
a romantic, even heroic figure (likely to be played 
by a handsome, virile actor in the Clint Eastwood mould), 
his isolation is really a pathological state, and the 
strength of will which is so much a part of this 
character, a strange fruit for such barren soil. It 
is good to be se 1 f- re 1 ian t in the practical sense of 
being able to draw on one's own resources, but having 
the confidence to do this, that is, to act independently 
of others for change in the objective world, is an ability 
which is r·ooted in our sense of self. I have already 
quoted Josef Pieper on the need for our relations with 
objective being to be powered from an inner life, so 
that any outward step is balanced by a corresponding 
deepening in our understanding. He goes on to say that 
"where this step attains a world that is in principle 
complete (with totality as its aim) the reflective 
self, characteristic of spirit, is also reached. 
The two together constitute spirit: not only the 
capacity to relate oneself to thA whole of reality, 
to the whole world, but an unlimited capacity 
of living in oneself, the gift of self-reliance 
and independence that, in the philosophical 
tradition of Europe, have always been regarded 
as the at tributes of the human person, of being 
a person !'4 
f1J 
must have accepted 
creation and the 
Before we can feel this inwardness we 
our discontinuity with the rest of 
uniqueness of our own perception of 
rightly stresses the potential richness 
and the way in which our outer and 
reality. Pieper 
of consciousness 
inner lives are 
mlJtur~ll y clependent and complement each other; so far 
from having to choose which is real and which is illusory 
we find that one informs the other. Thus, our private 
world which no one else can really share should be a 
source of strength, giving us the power to act freely 
and independently, and not a cause of neurotic anxiety. 
The point is that each individual consciousness is a 
response to the same, or almost the same, public world. 
This is why exchanging views with other people is so 
necessary and rewarding. Far from being uncommun icable, 
our percept ions of reality are eminently sui ted to being 
given public exposure, and though this process will 
not make them in any sense more or less real, it should 
sharpen and refine them, showing up as fantastic some 
notions while giving due weight to others. Without 
doubt there is a collective consciousness which is in 
a continual state of change with the need to absorb 
new ways of looking at things, but the traffic is two 
way; we are deeply affected by the views of others, 
to the extent that it is not possible to say that any 
individual world picture is our own other than in the 
sense that we have chosen to adopt it as our own. 
It is of prime importance to our mental health and well-
being that we should furnish our lives, not just for 
the sake of distraction but so as to have a life at 
all and not just a mere existence. For although we 
must find our own identity through the realisation of 
our apartness from other people, we become aware at 
the same time of the depth and solidity of other lives 
and their consequent claim on our attention; because 
each of us has a unique point of view we are all of 
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value to each other. Thus we furnish our lives with 
other people out of a deep-rooted need for companionship 
and so that we can in cooperating with others attempt 
to control the environment which we all share. For 
though we have the capacity for having an inner life 
whirh all nws_ us to live really in a world which is much 
wider and richer than the confines of our immediate 
environment would otherwise allow, and this is what 
makes us spiritual rather than merely animal beings, 
nevertheless, we are embodied, and as whole people and 
not just phantoms we care very much about the material 
world which surrounds us and which we inhabit. Some 
people are more aesthetically sensitive than others 
but whether or not we care about beauty, and if we do 
we are lucky because it is one of the pleasures of life, 
our physical surroundings are intimately related to 
ourselves and we to them. Not only is it very hard 
to make any sense of the notion of disembodied existence, 
it is also hard to make any sense of the notion of a 
life lived other than in a particular environment; this 
is simply a fact about human nature. And environmental 
influences help to form our culture by shaping our human 
needs and interests, which are no less our own for being 
in part a response to external conditions. This is 
to speak in very general terms but it is in practice 
possible to map out this area of in ter-re la ting forces, 
that is, to make a study of human nature which takes 
into account the effects of environment, as well as 
our deeply-rooted need to be involved with other people. 
Of course no such study could ever be completed, such 
is the com;:-1lexi ty of human experience, but certain basic 
traits would be found to cross all cultural barriers, 
suggesting that some, at least, of our driving forces 
come from within. 
The urge to survive through the means of a constant 
process of 
description 
adaptation is 
of the innate 
11~ 
a very general, 
force which is in 
blanket 
us all, 
and of the message it conveys. This is an 
oversimplification, of course, because natural selection 
in the case of man, a social being, has produced in 
us an emotional constitution such that we value a great 
many things besides our own preservation, and some more 
than our ov:r; preservation, As Mary Midg~ley says, "Once 
a species becomes social at all, its continued prosperity 
does not depend only on traits of behaviour likely to 
produce an individual's own survival, but also, and 
quite as much, on those favouring the survival of kin 
and group".5 She stresses the stultifying effect which 
attempts to reduce human motivation to the pursuit of 
one particular end are bound to have because they make 
concepts such as power or self-preservation all-embracing 
and consequently meaningless. If we can accept that 
a lot of different things are good for different reasons 
life becomes very much more interesting, because diversity 
always is more interesting than uniformity, and because 
we let in the reality of conflict. Here we have the 
"is", the "something else" from which moral "oughts" 
must be derived without reference to God or the "Good" 
because of the sheer necessity of working out a way 
of resolving conflicts. We cannot avoid making decisions, 
some of which will be moral ones because they will involve 
weighing up conflicting goods or choosing the lesser 
evil; and guiding us when we make decisions should be 
our knowledge and experience gained as members of families 
and communities which are anchored in a particular 
physical environment. Rather than practise a Cartesian-
like stripping down process we should try to develop 
our own powers of relating to objective reality so that 
moralilty need not be a hit or miss affair but an 
ex tens ion of our sympathy with our fellow human beings, 
which, if anything, is likely to be broadened the more 
we are capable of exercising our imaginations. If we 
isolate ourselves from others and do not pay any attention 
to nature we only prevent ourselves from finding out 
about life. Iris Murdoch, we recall, says that virtue 
116 
and knowledge are connected, and we do not want to 
diminish ourselves emotionally pace Simone Weil. This 
is the message of naturalism, and it accords well with 
the Christian view that goodness is as much to do with 
being as doing. 
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"I am convinced that affliction on the one hand and 
on the other hand joy, understood as pure and total 
adherence to perfect beauty, implying as they do the 
loss of ov"io.f-"',.,...,.nr-. ..._.. .J\ . ...J.... .__.. Ll \_.. i l '-' \...... ' are two keys by which 
land of reality " ( PCAD8 3 ). one enters the pure land, the 
AiAtiiii.W~l. th Simone Weil ~ unfailing accuracy the malaise of 
time, but she was unable the factory workers of her 
to offer a human solution to the human problem she felt 
so acutely. Perversely, she places God beyond 
the limit of hope and in the same breath asks us as 
a lesson in detachment to appreciate the beauty of the 
blind necessity which is our cross. This theology 
fashioned out of divine indifference contrasts oddly 
with her practical concern about the inhuman scale on 
which factory production is organised, with its reduction 
of the worker to the status of a means to an end which 
is to him. She criticizes Marx for 
not 
completely alien 
seeing that a change in the relationship between 
the classes will remain a pure illusion if it is not 
accompanied by a technical revolution which will be 
crystallised in new machinery (E56). For under present 
factory conditions the worker, condemned to repeat the 
same mechanical gesture, day in, day out, is unable 
to satisfy the human need to make a plan and carry it 
out, to build on the past and to exercise some control 
over the future, to make sense of his life, in other 
words. As only a tiny part of a whole, of whose overall 
complexity he cannot conceive, the worker becomes 
alienated from a society in which he appears more like 
a slave than a free man. In her political writings 
Simone Weil sets a high value on human individuality, 
which she argues would be best served by being rooted 
in a society which recognised the human need for finality, 
for it is this lack of finality which reduces us to 
the status of slaves whose only end is keeping on being 
able to do what they are doing. 
She offers a transcendental solution, and this is how 
Miklos Vet~ explains it: 
"Desire is a 'direction', 'a beginning towards 
something', so it implies the future. 
case when desire aims at the present 
of the contemplation of beauty. When 
The only 
is in that 
the future 
is not involved in our life, the manifestations 
of finality or of particular ends are not present 
either. Particular ends are irremediably absent 
from the worker's life, but finality itself, a 
finality without ends, 
finality without ends is 
or the essence of ends. 
man think of God, find 
might be present. The 
God, the end of ends, 
Everything which makes 
God in his work and in 
his life, fills his existence with finality. 
Beauty has a sacramental value by enabling us 
to enter the path leading to God.~ 
It is by way of beauty, says Miklos Veto, that man does 
his apprenticeship 
an object of desire 
in detachment, because beauty as 
is unique. Simone Weil writes that 
"Beauty is a carnal attraction which keeps its distance 
and involves a renunciation, including the most intimate 
renunciation, that of the imagination. We want to eat 
every other object of desire. Beauty is what we des ire 
without wanting to eat. We only want it to be" (PG196). 
In this way beauty can be a lever which tears us away 
from the imaginary into the real, and from time into 
eternity, if only our natural hunger for finality can 
be transformed into love of the order of the world, 
whose radiance we call beauty. 
There is indeed a very real sense in which beauty can 
do us good, but it is not quite the sense that Simone 
had in mind. It takes us out of ourselves, as common 
wisdom would express 't-lv that is, it teaches us our 
11D 
proper place in the world. When Simone Weil says that 
we should lose ourselves in pure and total adherence 
to perfect beauty, she means just that, but what she 
is really offering is escape, a refusal of the human 
condition. An appreciation of beauty can enhance our 
lives beyond measure, in a way that is surely perfectly 
familiar to most of us. Yet if this is the effect of 
beauty on us, it is not its function; both Mary Midgley 
is the complete 
would call its 
and Iris 
otherness 
Murdoch remind us that it 
of beauty, what Simone Weil 
necessity, which "does us good." 
" In fact I do not think 
romantics really believed 
what we give and in our 
live, although the lesser 
that any of the great 
that we receive but 
life alone does nature 
ones tended to follow 
Kant's lead and use nature as an occasion for 
exalted self-feeling. The great romantics, 
including the one I have just quoted, transcended 
'romanticism'. A self-directed enjoyment of nature 
seems to me to be something forced. More naturally, 
as well as more properly, we take a selVforgetful 
pleasure in the sheer alien pointless existenc_e 
of animals, birds, stones and trees. 'Not how the 
world is, but that it is, is the mystical' . 11 (SoG 
85) 
One final point 
contemplated with 
as Janet Radcliffe 
about beauty as something 
the object of purifying the 
Richards points out though 
to be 
soul: 
in a 
d iffe:c -?n t con text, "beauty is not a rna t ter of what you. 
are, it is a matter of what you look like. The idea 
that beauty is truth, however deeply entrenched in the 
roman tic mind, is just nonsense." 2 The idea that beauty 
is truth is one to which Simone Weil is deeply attached 
because of her belief that beauty is the only face of 
the real that we as fallen people are able to love, 
and so of special value. This identification is implied 
l~l 
by Iris Murdoch also~ if beauty existed only in the 
eye of the beholder, she would not attribute to it the 
power' for changing personality which she does. It is 
obviously a good thing to appreciate beauty and work 
to develop one's taste because this capacity can bring 
enormous olE;as ure, but to link moral development closely 
with aesthetic development is perhaps fane iful. I think 
that when she talks about the transformation of selfish 
energy Iris Murdoch comes uncomfortably close to the 
Weilian ideal of self-negation, but about the beneficial 
effects of good art, and especially literature, she 
is on surer ground. 
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III Conc:.l usi en 
Together, Iris Murdoch, G.E.M. Anscombe and f'ilary Midgley 
show us con vine ingly that there is something wrong with 
modern moral philosophy. Miss A~scombe says that the 
expectation _of some sort of future gain is no kind of 
basis on which to found a moral principle, and suggests 
that consideration of the concept of virtue is the jumping 
off point for a study of ethics. This is what Iris 
Murdoch is attempting, and she sees virtue as the fruit 
of a certain state of mind, emptied of self and looking 
towards the good 
and absolute. I 
and the 
think 
real 
this 
·,.;hich are 11 out there 11 
old-fashioned idea of 
character building is very important, though this notion, 
with its ~litist overtones, is bound to be unpopular 
amongst the fiercely 
justification must be 
by invoking Goodness 
egalitarian. However, a fuller 
found for it than can be given 
as a quasi-Platonic form. Iris 
Murdoch's argument is really only consistent with theism. 
As Basil Mitchell says, 11 The Good, as Iris Murdoch 
conceives it, really does look like a severely attentuated 
God (a sort of Cheshire Cat' s smile) 1' 1 Simone 
Weil, that other Platonist, also looked for the good 
beyond the self, sometimes with strange results: 
'
4 The image of the mystic body of Christ is very 
attractive. But I see the ~mportance which is 
today accorded to this image as one of the gravest 
signs of our moral decay. For our true dignity 
does not lie in being part of a body, be it mystic, 
be it that of Christ. It liP=" in this, that in 
the state of perfection which is the vocation 
of each one of us we live no longer in ourselves 
but Christ lives in us; so that through this state 
Christ in his wholeness, in his indivisible unity, 
becomes in a sense each one of us ... ~'(AD 59) 
Once again Simone Weil's though~ seems to have been 
formed by a mistrust of what is human in us, in this 
11.+ 
case our instinct for sociability, our collective feelings 
and our need to form part of something which is greater 
than our isola ted selves. She implies that the Church 
is as likely as any secular party or association to 
bring out the unattractive human traits which can be 
dormant in the individual but which so often rear their 
She cites abuses of power by the heads in company. 
Church such as the 
Church champions the 
the tyranny of the 
Inquisition, and 
the 
suggests that the 
from 
these 
a genuine 
are the 
in a position 
flesh pushes us 
say 'we;; or 
cause of individual against 
state 
conviction 
and 
of 
freedom of 
their worth 
opinion, not 
but because 
causes traditionally espoused by 
of comparative weakness (AD 60). 
to say 'I' and the devil pushes 
to say, as do dictators, 'I' 
groups 
"The 
us 
with 
to 
a 
collective meaning " (AD 25). Collective feeling is 
therefore bad because it is another case of 
self-deception, that is, in very general terms, of 
substituting the devil for God: "And, in accordance 
with his own mission, the devil produces a false imitation 
of the divine, a substitute for the divine" (AD 25). 
In this instance our need to form part of something 
greater than ourselves makes us vulnerable to the evil 
of totalitarianism. 
The danger Simone Weil is warning us of is real and 
must have seemed especially so to someone who was 
witnessing the rise of Hitler. In her political writings 
she attacks the nation state and champions the cause 
of the individual against the collective. In her 
religious thought she seems to have gone a step further, 
for as the individual cannot be an end in himself and 
will look for "food", something to live by and for, 
in the world outside himself, he is always vulnerable. 
His dissatisfaction and his need to progress, his craving 
for self-justification, affection and approval all combine 
to make man dynamic and goal-orienta ted: "The hunger 
for finality constitutes the being of every man" (CS 
2 65) and the source of all his energy beyond what is 
needed for mere survival. Simone Weil would have us 
divert this energy from the task of self-preservation 
and self-expansion and destroy it, and thinks we can 
achieve this by ceasing to orientate ourselves towards 
the future.. As Miklos Veto puts it, she urges us to 
renounce the ill us ion that we govern the future, that 
thirst gives us the right to a drink and hunger the 
right to a meal, 2 and by so doing accept the past (see 
page 17 above). The desire which is born out of this 
renunciation is pure; that is to say that it has no 
object or direction other than to follow the will of 
God. At this point it can be said that we live no longer 
in our selves but Christ lives in us, because our will 
is completely identifiable with the will of God, which 
is evident in everything which has happened up until 
this point in time (including all the evil and suffering): 
" we must feel the reality and the presence of God 
through all exterior things without exception as clearly 
as a hand feels the consistency of the paper through 
the pen holder and the pen " (AD 14). 
"" Georges Frenaud traces the root of error here to Simone 
Weil's false interpretation of the creation, which he 
says she sees as "a sort of pantheistic emanation". 3 
The divide between God and his creation, which should 
be bridged by a loving relationship, becomes an obstacle 
to God in his at tempt to love God, to be overcome as 
we have seen by the creature's surrender of his autonomy 
and his assimilation into the divine scheme in a sense 
so literal that he becomes God himself. 
sets the record straight: 
Cha;·les Moeller 
"No, Christ in us is not a parasite; our soul is 
not this utterly passive container. God is not 
this cancer which devours us. Instead of a loving 
dialogue between the soul and God, instead of 
the 'adult' man, adoptive son, joint heir with 
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Christ, there is nothing left in the system of 
Simone Weil but monsters, thieves of liberty, 
and slaves who have only to be massacred~4 
In The Need for Roots Simone Weil writes: "The first 
study to make is of the needs which are to the life 
of the soul what the need for food, sleep and warmth 
are to the life of the body" (El4). She lists them: 
order, liberty, responsibility, equality, hierarchy, 
honour, punishment, freedom of opinion, security, risk, 
private property, public property, truth, and gives 
a warning: we must never confuse them with desires, 
caprices, fantasies or vices, which, unlike needs, know 
no bound (E 16). These needs are the basic requirements 
on whose fulfilment our humanity depends, but their 
fulfilment is not sufficient to assure our own for we 
need something more if we are to live rather than merely 
exist, namely the unconditional love of others which 
alone can teach us what charity is. This item is missing 
from Simone's list not because she did not value the 
virtue of charity, which she most certainly did, but 
because she believed it to be supernatural. She stripped 
it of its human under-pinning and characterised it as 
connected, 
that state 
through grace, with our mere existence, 
of decreation which lesser beings know 
in 
as 
depression. This kind of austerity may have worked 
for Simone Weil, but it would not work for most of us. 
I think that the fundamental link between Iris Murdoch 
and Simone Weil is their conviction that the state of 
our being ~ot merely effects the moral level of our 
actions, but is perfectly reflected in that moral level. 
This way of looking at things causes the distinction 
between inner and outer, private and public, being and 
doing to be blurred, and the gap which was previously 
bridged by an effort of will closes. Iris Murdoch 
believes one of Simone Weil's keenest insights to be 
her insistence that we should not perform those acts 
12.7 
of charity which we do not feel compelled to perform, 
and she contrasts contrived and natural goodness in 
the central characters of her nove 1 The Be 11, Mi chae 1 
and Dora. The one, seemingly "thought=out", can create 
only confusion and disaster, while Dora, though muddle-
headed, ins t.inc t i ve ly does the thing which heals. Iris 
Murdoch is telling us to beware of moral pretentiousness, 
for in the end it will surely catch us out. 
Thus 
with 
that 
and, 
close 
far Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil are in agreement 
each other and with Mary Midgley who also thinks 
our moral field of vision has personal bounds, 
that it follows from this that goodness begins 
to home and not in an intellectual attempt to 
increase our range of 
believes we 
potential courses of action. 
should try to understand our Mary Midgley 
own nature and that 
the rna terial world. 
radical: we should 
the key lies in our adjusting to 
By contrast Simone Weil is equally 
work towards annihilation of the 
self. Iris Murdoch has a foot in both 
she thinks that the self is 
camps. Like 
an obstacle Simone Weil 
it 
but 
prevents 
unlike 
to moral 
things as 
does not 
progress because 
they really are, 
despair of it. Indeed, she 
us from seeing 
Simone Weil she 
believes that 
goodness 
feel in 
to be real must have a personal face: "I also 
the long run that one must be good in a way 
peculiar to oneself, that one must be in some sense 
characteristic in one's goodness, so that the whole 
area of life is concerned with understanding one's own 
personality and with building a sort of picture of 
oneself .... ".5 I find this v~ew both attractive and 
profound, but I believe that 
of the personality remains a 
course is Simone Weil's and 
Iris Murdoch's picture 
reductionist one as of 
that because of this, 
her Good will always be out of reach and we shall remain 
trapped in a cycle of striving and failure. 
'The reason why Iris Murdoch cannot lead us out of this 
trap is that she does not, as a Platonist, believe that 
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virtue can arise naturally out of the sys tern of 
needs and drives which constitutes a human personality. 
For her, as for others in the tradition to which 
Cartesianism and existentialism belong, virtue is non-
natural, and set apart from our strictly human traits. 
It is Mary Midgley who, by taking a view of human nature 
which is completely opposed to the reductionist one, 
shows us how the seeds of virtue are already planted 
deep inside us, and how, by taking a critical attitude 
towards our own conduct and making conscious efforts 
to discipline our hearts and control our actions, we 
can grow into goodness. And this goodness is not an 
ideal which inspires but ultimately eludes us, but 
the actual and attainable fruit of personal integrity. 
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POSTCRIPT 
I have set out to show the strengths and 
of Simone Weil's understanding of the concept 
firstly by _looking in a general way at the 
between her theological scheme and orthodox 
weaknesses 
of virtue, 
disparity 
Christian 
belief, and then by relating these differences to strands 
in the work of some British moral philosophers. I have 
tried to compare the thought of Simone Weil and Iris 
Murdoch, while drawing on G.E..M.Anscombe, Dorothy Emmet 
and IV!ary !Vlidgley as commentators. 
The sincerity of Simone Weil's concern for the disadvan-
taged is not in doubt, nor is the justice of her apprec-
iation of the contemplative spirit. The problem is 
that she was not able to set her celebrated attitude 
of waiting into a wider context. One effect of this 
is that, while on closer study admiration gives way 
to a suspicion that something vital is being left out 
of the picture, superficial contact with Simone Weil' s 
work leaves the impression that one has been edified 
and inspired. Self-sacrifice, taking the form of a 
loosening, and eventual letting go of our hold on the 
things which are commonly held to make life worth living, 
is at the heart of Simone Weil' s thought, and this is 
\vorrying because self-denial is not good in itself but 
only as a means to an end, and it is no part of 
Christianity to teach otherwise. However, it is this 
aspect of Simone Weil's work which, I think, has attracted 
Iris Murdoch, who is concerned by what she believes 
to be the increasingly pragmatic tone of much modern 
moral philosophy. Here she has a powerful ally in G.E.M. 
Anscombe who argues srongly for the absolute nature 
of moral commands, and against any consideration of 
practical consequences, as potentially corrupting. 
It is this disregard of consequences, this 
disinterestedness of which, for Simone Weil and Iris 
1J1 
Murdoch at least, a contempt for consolation in any 
form is such an imp or tan t part, which links these three 
and which gives their conception of virtue its rather 
inhuman character. Simone Weil' s insight into the good 
man as one who cannot help but do the right thing is 
correct insofar as it draws attention to the fact that 
virtue lies not in fleeting action but in a disposition 
with which our character is stamped through and through. 
But a too-rigorous disassociation of the seat of gooJ~ess, 
and more imp or tan t ly, goodness i tse 1 f, from the world 
.. ._ 
and the Platonism of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch 
tends to lead them in this direction is as sterile 
as the existentialism to which they would want to offer 
an alternative. 
I have tried to show how Mary Midgley provides an escape 
from this impasse by her detailed working-out of the 
interdependence, 
practical, of 
which is as much 
the human being 
conceptual 
and his 
as it is 
physical 
environment, which some moral philosophers have tended 
to treat as incidental. Following Bishop Butler, she 
locates virtue, not in the realm of the ideal and the 
unrealisable, but much closer to horne, and conceives 
it as definable in exclusively human terms. 
Paradoxically, Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch with their 
wide use of the vocabulary of religious, and specifically 
Christian, belief, are unable to present a picture of 
virtue which accords nearly as well with the Christian 
view of personal fulfillment as that of Mary Midgley, 
who is silent on the question of faith. 
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